893.0146/884
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
Captain Schuirmann24 handed to me yesterday the paper here [Page 476] attached.25 He said that the recommendations envisaged reduction in numbers of the Marine Guard at Peiping and at Chingwangtao and complete withdrawal from Tientsin.
I gave a brief outline of our thought and policy on the subject of withdrawal of American nationals and withdrawal of the landed armed forces. I said that I perceived no objection to reducing the numbers of the Guard at Peiping and at Chingwangtao as indicated, but that I would recommend strongly against a complete withdrawal from Tientsin. I suggested that instead of withdrawing 11 officers and 182 men from Tientsin they make withdrawal of approximately half that number. I pointed out that Admiral Hart has reported that he is reducing the numbers at Peiping and Tientsin by a process of normal attrition (non-replacement). I said that we need continuance of a reasonable number of marines at each of the three points until such time as we might wish to make a sweeping evacuation. I mentioned the fact that the Marines had been of substantial assistance recently when a considerable number of our civilian nationals were coming out from Peiping and Tientsin via Chingwangtao.
Captain Schuirmann said that he would report to Admiral Stark on what I had said.26
- Capt. Roscoe E. Schuirmann, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.↩
- Not printed.↩
- January 31, 1941, the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) noted that Captain Schuirmann had informed him that the matter had been “settled by decision of the President.” In May the Marine strength in North China was reduced from 375 to 259.↩