793.94119/694: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State84
[Received November 25—12:48 p.m.]
1194–1198. The following is summary of a telegram sent by my British colleague to London dated November 21, 1940:
The communication from Ribbentrop to the Chinese Ambassador (Chungking’s telegram No. A) accords well with Japan’s present attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, respectively. It is easily credible that the Japanese Foreign Minister has made contact with Chiang and submitted peace terms which the Foreign Minister considers Uniang will regard as too reasonable to be refused. The Japanese offer is, however, in the usual Axis fashion, undoubtedly accompanied by the threat that in the event of Chungking’s continued recalcitrance the Axis Powers will recognize Wang Cning-wei. I have moreover been informed from a reliable source that German pressure is responsible for this offer of peace. There is reason to believe, although Wang is now being dangling, if there appears no hope of agreement with the Chinese Government by the end of November the Japanese Government will finally conclude a treaty with him. All of this indicates the weakness of Japan and her subservience to Germany, and if Chiang should now swallow the bait he would be making a mistake.
2. Although we have not hitherto been able to obtain definitely the terms offered in Chungking and Nanking theoretically it may be assumed that the basis would be Konoye’s statement of December 1938 in a clarified and improved version, perhaps with definite arrangements for the “economic collaboration” of China with Japan and for the progressive withdrawal of Japanese troops. Without doubt there has been a recent shift of the center of Japanese interest away from China in the direction of the Southern Pacific. This reported departure makes it more probable that the terms now offered to Chiang and to Wang will be more favorable than any hitherto produced. The Foreign Minister has in fact told me that any peace offer with which he personally was associated would be so.
3. Japan’s most immediate objective, apart from the conclusion of peace with China, appears to be to control Indochina, completely as regards economic and at least partially politically. There is some justification [Page 445] for the Japanese belief that they will be able to secure their aims by fifth column intrigue, negotiation and diplomatic pressure, because of the combination 01 the culpably weak and anti-British Indochina Government with the slavishly pro-German Government attitude of Vichy.
If, however, force becomes necessary in the last resort, the Japanese have concentrated in Hainan some three divisions which are to be used as circumstances require and as may be permitted by the course of the European war and the attitude of the United States.
4. Mr. Matsuoka was not, I think, trying deliberately to mislead us in giving the pledge which I quoted in paragraph 4 of my telegram No. B. (This was the telegram sent in our 1123, November 11, 9 a.m.85). I am sure he is satisfied that Japan will not need to fire a shot in obtaining her ends in Indochina. In Japan, however, the Foreign Minister proposes and the army disposes (please refer to Shanghai’s telegram No. C). In any case Mr. Matsuoka’s reservation in the last sentence of the paragraph referred to serves to safeguard himself against unexpected developments. There is nothing so far as I can see which will prevent Indochina with all of its valuable economic resources from falling into Japan’s hands in fact if not in name except the firmest possible attitude on the part of the American Government. The dismay occasioned in Japan on learning that the United States Government had decided to withdraw American citizens from Japan indicates how strong a reaction is produced by any American move. It is just possible that this particular game might be considered by the Japanese Government as not worth the candle if it were certain that severe economic reprisals would be forthcoming.
5. It would seem that the German démarche (Chungking’s telegram number A), since it followed so closely Molotov’s visit, must have been (1) made by agreement with Molotov or (2) a means of exerting inferior pressure on Moscow because of dissatisfaction with that visit. It is my feeling that (2) fits better with reports from other sources of the small political achievement of the mission. If it is true that Russia is considering resisting pressure from Germany, there could be nothing more disconcerting from her point of view at this juncture than peace between China and Japan concluded under German auspices.
Following is the substance of telegrams numbered A and C referred to above.
Begin telegram A, from Chungking dated November 19: Chiang Kai-shek stated yesterday in strict confidence that Ribbentrop summoned the Chinese Ambassador immediately after Molotov had visited Berlin and conveyed to the Ambassador a message substantially as follows:
The whole of Europe is now under German control (no mention was made of Italy). The war would be over by the end of 1940 or by early spring at the latest. It was advised that the Chinese Government should make peace promptly with Japan and should join the Axis, this being her last opportunity to be admitted to the fold. In case China refused to make peace, Japan and then Italy would recognize [Page 446] Wang Ching-wei and it would thereupon become impossible for Germany to refrain from taking action in concert with her allies. End telegram A.
Begin telegram C, from Shanghai dated November 20:
An American journalist was informed on November 13 by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese fleet in China, who had had several drinks, that the Japanese intended, in order to secure bases at Camranh and Saigon for defense against Great Britain, to move soon into southern Indochina.
They intended to seize British North Borneo as soon as hostilities break out with Britain. No blockade of Singapore was planned. They would cut communications eastward and at their leisure deal with Hong Kong. (End telegram C).
- The five sections of this message, transmitted as telegrams Nos. 1194–1198, are printed as one document↩
- For gist of telegram No. 1123, see telegram No. 963, October 9, 8 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan and footnote, printed in vol. i, section entitled “Relations of Japan With the Axis Powers and With the Soviet Union.”↩