Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The Far East, Volume IV

793.94/16319: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, November 16, 1940—3 p.m.
[Received November 16—8:07 a.m.]

1159. Embassy’s 1147, November 14, 2 p.m.⁶⁶ There are current in Tokyo many rumors concerning possible subjects discussed and decisions reached at the recent Imperial Conference, including such possibilities as (1) a decision to undertake further aggressive action toward “areas to the southward” including some or all of the following places: Hong Kong, Singapore, Netherland Indies, Southern French Indochina and (2) policies involving Russo-Japanese relations. I see no reason, however, to doubt the creditability of the statements released that the conference dealt with “questions related to the China incident.” It is being suggested in some quarters that revision of the general policy laid down by the Konoye statement of December 22, 1938,⁶⁷ (Embassy’s despatch 3535, December 23, 1938⁶⁸) was considered in order to obtain the sanction of an Imperial Conference to a change in fundamental policy enabling the Japanese Government “to deal” with Chiang Kai Shek and the present leaders of the Chinese National Government. The possibility that Japan may have altered its policy to allow negotiations with the Chinese National Government is not to be overlooked, particularly in the light of statement to me that he hopes to conduct negotiations with Chiang Kai Shek (Embassy’s telegram 1131, November 11, 10 p.m.⁶⁹).

Reports from Chungking would indicate that no overtures have yet been made, and this angle could probably be best reported from Chungking but I shall continue to endeavor to gather any pertinent information. There is a rumor which cannot be confirmed that there are two Chungking representatives in Tokyo at the present time.

It has also been suggested that the Imperial Conference was called for the purpose of obtaining agreement to and sanction of the draft treaty which was drawn up by General Abe and Wang Ching-wei at Nanking at the close of August this year. The only vernacular comment on the “settlement of the China incident” which has appeared since November 13 is a long editorial comment in the Nichi Nichi November 15 (Embassy’s 1153, November 15, 7 p.m.⁶⁶).

It is not necessary to emphasize the strong desire of the Japanese government and people “to settle the China incident”; this represents the very basis of present Japanese high policy. The fact that an imperial conference was held and announcement made of complete agreement on questions relating to the China incident would indicate the confidence of the Government that at least a pro forma settlement of the incident may be expected in the relatively near future. Even though the Japanese can hardly expect a “settlement” which will bring tranquillity to East Asia at once, an agreement or arrangement could be announced which would constitute at least a “settlement” in name. It is difficult to foresee how this could include renunciation of the present Chinese puppet regimes and therefore any negotiations even with Chiang Kai Shek would probably have to be conducted in such manner as to envisage retention of some of those regimes.

The Japanese Government’s statement of November 3, 1938⁷⁰ (Embassy’s despatch 3416, November 4, 1938⁷¹) and the Konoye statement of December 22, 1938, emphasize the necessity of concluding an anti-comintern agreement between Japan and China in keeping with the Japan–Germany–Italy Anti-Comintern Pact,⁷² the stationing of Japanese troops at “specified points” in China, presumably for defense against communism, and the designation of inner-Mongolia as a special anti-comintern area. The conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance and the possible further strengthening of Russo-German relations as a result of the Molotov⁷³ visit to Berlin may have obviated or changed many of the compelling reasons for Japan’s insistence on cooperation with China in defense against communism. Japan is now seeking a nonaggression pact with Russia. It is possible that the Imperial Conference was called to settle questions concerning recognition of the Wang regime and regarding a redefinition of Japan’s fundamental policy for settlement of the China incident in order to remove or to alter provisions naturally offensive to Soviet Russia. Even a pro forma settlement with China, if accomplished parallel to or in conjunction with the Tripartite Alliance, would greatly lessen criticism of the Alliance, would go far to justify the pact even in the eyes of its silent critics, and by greatly enhancing the prestige of the Konoye Government would alleviate much of the internal tension. (There would remain, of course, most of the present economic problems.) Axis cooperation and a benevolent Russia would to some extent offset the weakness of the Wang regime.

The Japanese Government has no doubt been kept informed of pertinent details of the recent conversations between Germany and Russia in Berlin. Japan’s diplomatic policies may now be expected to proceed along with those of the Axis Powers, and it is probable that announcement of any settlement of the China incident or significant changes in Japan’s basic policies will be timed to serve as a harmonious accompaniment to or part of any new démarche by the totalitarian powers, probably including Russia, the vital link between Tokyo, Berlin and Rome.

Grew

66. Not printed.
67. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 482.
68. Foreign Relations, 1938, vol. iv, p. 110.
69. Printed in vol. i, section entitled “Relations of Japan With the Axis Powers and With the Soviet Union.”
66. Not printed.
70. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 477.
71. Not printed.
72. Signed at Rome, November 6, 1937; Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 159.
73. Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs; for his visit to Berlin, see vol. i, index.