793.94/16261: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:40 p.m.]
543. 1. In our conversation of October 18 (my telegrams Nos. 526 and 528)61 General Chiang Kai-shek explained that one of the two chief dangers under the continuation of Chinese resistance to Japan involved the activities of the Chinese Communists who are utilizing oral propaganda in attacking the policy of the Chinese Government with the consequent deterioration of social and economic conditions and the morale of the people. He also made note of the present equivocal attitude of Soviet Russia vis-à-vis China, pointing out that in his view Russian policy in the Far East can be influenced by such actions and clearly inferring that if the United States does not adopt a policy of active aid to China there is a likely possibility that Russia will be led to support and lend large scale aid to the Chinese Communists. This latter possibility was mentioned in my telegram No. 360, July 24, 10 a.m.
2. In my telegrams 353, July 20, 10 a.m. and 357 [377], August 3, noon, I made mention of reports to the effect that the National Government and the Chinese Communists had, as a result of negotiations, reached an understanding in regard to several conflicting problems and in my political summary for September62 I reported that Kuomintang-Communist relations remained harmonious, although measures for the removal of the new Fourth Army from Central to North China were yet to be devised.
3. Since my last conversation with the Generalissimo, I have been informed by a source very close to the Generalissimo that the Chinese Communists have refused to move their forces now operating in Central China to North China. The same informant confirmed, however, that the Chinese Communists desire to prolong the Sino-Japanese conflict; but he expressed the opinion that the Communists wish to foster the continuation of hostilities primarily with a view to consolidating their position in China. In other words they are taking advantage of Chiang’s preoccupation with the Sino-Japanese conflict to strengthen their own position in various areas of Central and North China. In this connection, it is generally conceded, even in local Communist quarters, that the Chinese Communists have engaged in little military activity against the Japanese forces in the past 18 months, contenting themselves largely with the establishment of military bases, [Page 430] mobilization of the people, and defense measures against Japanese mopping-up campaigns.
4. I am of the opinion that the possibility of an open break between the National Government and the Chinese Communists remains remote at this time, although failure of the United States and Great Britain to afford timely aid to China may in the end result in Communist ascendency in China. Under existing circumstances, I believe that both factions are so committed to the expulsion of the Japanese and that such a course of action is of such vital concern to the existence of both groups that they will continue by means of compromise to cooperate against Japan. As has been indicated above, such a policy probably will benefit the Communists more than the existing government because the former is afforded the opportunity of consolidating its position in a country whose economic and social systems continue to deteriorate under the relentless impact of the Japanese military machine.
Sent to the Department only.