Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The Far East, Volume IV

711.94/1582

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Aide-Mémoire

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom feels that the collapse of the French resistance has created a situation which compels it to reconsider the policy it has pursued in the Far East for the last year. That policy has been to try to reach agreement with Japan on minor issues such as Tientsin, but to pursue a parallel course to that of the United States in rejecting Japanese plans for a new order in China at the expense of the unity and integrity of China and of legitimate European interests in the Far East. His Majesty’s Government recognise that the success of that policy hitherto has been largely due to the fact that the United States have supported it by maintaining their fleet in the Pacific.

2. In the view of the British Government the situation has been fundamentally changed by the fact that Great Britain is now the sole focus of resistance to the Axis powers in Europe and the pressure exerted by Germany and Italy on Japan to join the Axis and help itself to British, Dutch and French possessions⁸¹ and thereby destroy all external support to the Government of Chiang Kai-shek except that which he is able to obtain from Russia. As first consequences of the situation His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have just received demands from Japan that it should withdraw its troops from Shanghai and close the Hong Kong frontier and the Burma road so that no further supplies should reach Chiang Kai-shek by these routes and it recognises that if it yields to these demands they will probably be followed by others, that at any moment an occupation of some part of French Indo-China may take place and that this process must in the end not only gravely compromise the security of the British Commonwealth but the interests of the United States itself.

3. Inasmuch as the whole responsibility for maintaining resistance to Germany and Italy in Europe now devolves upon Great Britain alone His Majesty’s Government feels that it is now impossible for it to offer opposition to aggression both in Europe and the Far East. It cannot offer resistance to the demands of Japan to alter her status quo in the Pacific to the point of involving itself in war in the Pacific by itself. There would now therefore appear to be only two courses open. The first is that the United States should increase their pressure on Japan in order to maintain the status quo either by imposing a full embargo or by the despatch of ships to Singapore in full realisation that if these steps do not suffice to stop aggression it may result in war with Japan. The second is to wean Japan from aggression by a concrete offer to negotiate a new agreed settlement of the Far Eastern situation.

4. His Majesty’s Government would be glad to know whether it is possible for the United States Government to adopt the first course and if so His Majesty’s Government will cooperate in executing it. They feel that if the United States Government is able to do this it will suffice to maintain the status quo in the Far East without serious risk of war.

5. If the United States Government is unable to adopt this policy His Majesty’s Government would be glad to know whether it would cooperate in making proposals for a Far Eastern settlement. Sir Robert Craigie has informed the Foreign Office that he believes that if the United States and Great Britain were to agree upon it promptly an understanding might yet be reached with Japan along the following lines: (a) joint assistance in bringing about peace with Chinese Government on the basis of restoration of China’s independence and integrity. (b) Japan formally to undertake to remain neutral in the European war and to respect full territorial integrity, not only of the Netherlands East Indies but also of British, French and American possessions in the Pacific, so long as the statics quo of these territories is preserved. (c) The United States and members of the British Commonwealth to give Japan all financial and economic assistance and facilities in their power both now and during post-war reconstruction period. (d) Allied Governments to receive full guarantees against re-exports to enemy countries. (e) Question of future status of settlements and concessions in China to be left in abeyance until restoration of peace in Europe and China.

6. His Majesty’s Government do not wish to commit themselves to any particular proposals until it has ascertained whether the American Government will be willing, if suitable proposals can be agreed, to press them jointly upon the Japanese and the Chinese Governments. His Majesty’s Government is hopeful that this course might meet with success. It believes that the forces opposed to Japan’s entry into the war as an ally of Germany and Italy with all the risks that this must involve, are still powerful in Japan though the militarist party is rapidly gaining strength and may prevail unless some concrete alternative is presented to Japan. Japan’s most consistent anxiety is as to its future relations with Russia and these might be seriously prejudiced if it became involved in war in the Pacific as well as in China. The Japanese Government might well prefer a settlement which gave her peace and some of the demands in the Far East to taking the immense risks from their own point of view of plunging into war.

7. His Majesty’s Government hopes for an expression of the United States Government’s views at the earliest possible moment as at any time now an incident may take place in the Far East which may place the situation out of control.

Washington , June 27, 1940.

81. See also pp. 1 ff.