893.0146/864
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
Mr. Keith Officer77 telephoned me at seven o’clock last evening and asked whether the Australian Minister78 might call on me at my residence either immediately or after dinner—on an urgent matter.
Mr. Casey came to my residence at nine o’clock. Mr. Casey gave a some what extended account of his estimate of the situation, especially the situation in the Far East. He said that the British Ambassador had spoken recently with a high officer of the Department of State and had been given to understand that, in the event of the British and/or the French “having to fight” at Shanghai, they should realize that the United States would not fight, and, with regard to the general situation in the Pacific, that it should not be expected that the United States would fight. He said that the Japanese had pressed and were pressing hard upon the French and the British and that the British were in no position to offer armed resistance. He said that it was obvious that the American Fleet might soon be “of necessity” withdrawn from the Pacific. He said that it seemed to him absolutely necessary for the British to enter an agreement with Japan, an agreement which would involve concessions, not “merely a shoestring but something substantial, something according the Japanese what they want in China”. He felt that this was likewise desirable with regard to the United States: he felt that Great Britain and the United States should come to an agreement with Japan. He had advised his Government to that effect. And, he said, he had talked it over with the British Ambassador and he understood that the British Ambassador was advising the British Government to the same effect. He said that he was telling me all of this informally and as friend to friend because he knew that he could speak frankly with me and he wanted to have my reaction.
I made reply that, first, regarding the situation at Shanghai, what Mr. Casey had said surprised me,—for no longer ago than last September the British Government had approached the American Government in writing79 with a statement to the effect that the British Government had no intention, in the event of a Japanese categorical demand for removal of its landed armed forces from points in China, of resisting by force, and the British Government had inquired what [Page 363] was the American Government’s attitude; and the American Government had replied in writing80 that it had at no time had the intention that its landed armed forces in China should engage in combat warfare against authorized armed forces of another power; and the American Government had cautioned against there being given any publicity to these statements of position. I said that I was giving Mr. Casey this in strict confidence. I said that I was surprised to hear that the British Ambassador had brought this question up in the connection and in the manner stated by Mr. Casey, and at this time. The important thing, however, to note was, I said, that each and both of the two Governments are on record, in a comparatively recent confidential exchange of written communications between them, to the effect that neither of them would expect or intend to offer armed resistance to a categorical Japanese demand that they withdraw from China the small contingents of armed forces which they have landed there.—Second, with regard to Mr. Casey’s thought that the British and/or the United States must now enter into an agreement with Japan, making substantial concessions, et cetera, et cetera, I would prefer, I said, that Mr. Casey broach that matter to and discuss it with a higher officer of the Department. I am, I said, an adviser within and of the Department of State; it is my function to furnish data and express views to appropriate officers of my own Government, and not my function to discuss with a minister of another country views which he has expressed to his government. I would, however, I said, say one or two things. I then said that I see no virtues in appeasement policies, whether practiced in Europe in 1938 or suggested for trial in East Asia in 1940, and that I would venture to predict that if the British and/or the American Governments were to go in for a program of “appeasing” Japan some or all of the following results would flow therefrom: (1) the Japanese, convinced thereby that the countries which approached them considered themselves impotent, would either decline to enter into commitments or would make extensive commitments with the deliberate intention of disregarding them whenever and wherever they chose; (2) the Japanese Army and Navy would act more boldly than ever; (3) bitter and lasting enmity of the Chinese would be incurred; (4) Chinese morale would be weakened and Chinese resistance might be soon brought to an end; (5) in that event the Japanese would be freed for very extensive adventurings to the southward (Indochina, Netherlands East Indies, Malay Peninsula, Siam, Burma, the Indian Ocean—and ultimately Australia and New Zealand); (6) the strength of the Axis-powers group would be greatly increased (that group would have at its disposal ample supplies of essential raw materials); (7) lines of communication between the [Page 364] southern Pacific and Europe would be completely cut; (8) the strategic and economic position of the Axis powers would be greatly benefited and the position of the powers opposing them would be increasingly made worse; (9) public opinion in the United States, and I should imagine also in Great Britain, would be unfavorably aroused; and (10) against all this there would accrue to the countries whose governments made that approach no increment of security or any other advantage.—I pointed out that there is at present going on in the world one war, in two theaters; that there are two countries today opposing force to force, China, which has been fighting for three years, and Great Britain, which has been fighting for nine months; that the Chinese have been rendering a great service by preventing the Japanese from rendering effective assistance to Germany; that as long as Chinese resistance to Japan continues, the Japanese will be busy in the Far East, but that if Chinese resistance collapses the Japanese will become free to give great assistance in a great variety of ways to Germany and Italy.
I said that in making these statements I was expressing merely an opinion, my opinion, and that Mr. Casey should not regard this as in any way indicating or suggesting a Departmental opinion or attitude. I said that I must request that in any memorandum or any report which he might make regarding this conversation he should leave my name out and should regard the record as strictly confidential. Mr. Casey said that he understood fully that I was merely expressing an opinion, personally and unofficially, and that he would consider the conversation as strictly confidential and would leave my name out of any recording of it.
- Counselor of the Australian Legation.↩
- Richard G. Casey.↩
- Aide-mémoire from the British Embassy to the Department of State, August 29, 1939, Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. iii, p. 215.↩
- Dated September 4, 1939; Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. iii, p. 230.↩