892.24/40: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 31—6:45 a.m.]
1197. My telegram 1178, December 23, 7 p.m.87 Ostrorog, who in Chauvel’s brief absence is Acting Chief of the Foreign Office’s Far Eastern Division, gave me an informal memorandum this morning based on reports recently received here. They indicate that the following categories of arms and armaments have been supplied the Thai by Japan: In November 33 single seater “pursuit planes type 97 and 6 heavy bombers”; on November 23 the “Societe Showat Susho Kaisha” delivered to Thailand 12 light bombers and “several cases of incendiary bullets”; on December 3 the same company placed on board a Japanese ship headed for Thailand “a considerable number of cases containing arms, machine guns, rifles and mountain guns.”
The memorandum adds that Thailand also “recently received 24 bombers and 200 tons of explosives” and that their authorities “are awaiting 40 antiaircraft guns”; that 150 tons of arms and ammunition, “including 4 light tanks were embarked at Yokohama on December 22 on the Asakiyama Maru bound for Thailand”; and that a contract of sale was signed on December 17 between the “Showat Susho Kaisha and the Thailand Government for the supplying of 70 tons of explosives to be delivered by March 17, 1941.”
Ostrorog, who was obviously perturbed at the quantity of arms and munitions now, according to French information, being delivered by Japan to Thailand, stated that it seemed quite evident that the Japanese are preparing under some pretext or another some form of aggression against Indochina; that other indications and the presence of Japanese officers in Thailand show that they are now consistently inciting the Thais to further border incidents. I reminded him that some weeks ago (my telegram 914, November 8, 11 a.m.87) Chauvel had felt that the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Kwangsi signified an abandonment of any plans for attacking Indochina.
His prompt explanation was that given the mountainous nature of the terrain in the area it would be much simpler for [Page 250] Japan to undertake the occupation of that colony by landing troops transported from the Island of Hainan where they are concentrated in large numbers to Haiphong.
I inquired as to Tokyo’s explanation of all this and he said that a telegram had been sent 2 days ago to Arsene-Henry to let the Gaimusho know that the French are aware that Japan is supplying arms to Thailand. The quantity he said is so important that a “mere protest” would seem inadequate and Indochina is hardly in a position to go further.
So far, however, the Japanese Foreign Office is continuing its “game” of giving all sorts of assurances of understanding of France’s present position and Japan’s unwillingness to take advantage thereof. He cited as an example of this atmosphere of “cordiality” the recent speeches at the welcoming lunch to the French Economic Delegation which has arrived at Tokyo.
Ostrorog said that the foregoing showed the urgency of obtaining means of defense for Indochina if its present status is to be maintained—a fact which, he felt convinced, was entirely to the interest of ourselves and the British. He read me the latest telegram received from Henry-Haye following his [sic] receipt by him of the Vichy telegram reported in my 1178, December 23, 7 p.m.89 and his subsequent conversation with the Under Secretary.90 (He reported therein that he was seeing the Secretary the following day.)91 The Ambassador seemed relatively satisfied with his conversation though still inclined to the view that a settlement of the question of the airplanes on the Bearn is an essential prerequisite to the supplying of arms for Indochina. He reported that we have agreed to approach the British along the lines suggested by Chauvel to obtain their prior consent to the transfer of the planes in question to Indochina before the French are asked again to go to Wiesbaden.
The telegram likewise said that we have promised to help immediately in connection with the “250 Ford trucks which Admiral Decoux needs so urgently.”
In conclusion Ostrorog referred again to the “incomprehensible attitude” of the British Minister at Bangkok. The French continue perplexed as to whether that attitude really represents the British Government’s view or whether it is just “another case of too much zeal on the part of a small Colonial-minded administrator with which class the French have had so many previous difficulties even at times when their relations were the closest.”