751G.92/135
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)
Mr. Butler51 called at his request. He referred to a call which he had made on Mr. Hornbeck some days previously, at which time he had informed Mr. Hornbeck that the British Government was giving consideration to the attitude which it should adopt toward possible developments in relations between Thailand and French Indochina. Mr. Butler explained that his Government was convinced that Japan would proceed to occupy points in southern French Indochina and that his Government wondered whether, when Japan embarked on expansion toward southern French Indochina, it would be to the interest of Great Britain (or of the United States) for the British Government to take an uncompromising attitude of opposition to any move by Thailand to recover certain parts of French Indochina which previously constituted part of Thailand. Mr. Butler said that his Government was naturally concerned in regard to the possibility of a Japanese attack on Singapore; that his Government considered it possible that Japan, after occupying points in southern French Indochina, would endeavor to make some arrangement with Thailand for the use of certain military bases in Thailand; and that possession [Page 215] by Japan of such military facilities in Thailand would bring the Japanese threat to Singapore much closer. Mr. Butler on behalf of his Government posed the question whether it would be preferable for Thailand, should Japan start toward southern French Indochina, to take over certain portions of southern French Indochina rather than for Thailand to feel estopped from so doing by the attitude of the British and the American Governments. Should Thailand take over Indochinese territory, would not Thailand be disposed to resist Japan and not to agree to give Japan military bases in Thailand? Should Thailand make no move to take over Indochinese territory, would not Thailand feel that it had been estopped from such action by the attitude of the British and American Governments and would not Thailand be more likely to agree to give Japan military facilities in Thailand? Mr. Butler said that these were questions which his Government was considering.
Mr. Butler indicated that his Government’s reports were to the effect that the Thai Government thought that this Government had been speaking to it as to a nation like Japan which had been engaged for a long period in aggression, whereas Thailand had not made any aggressive move.
Mr. Butler said that his Government would be interested in being informed of this Government’s attitude and position toward the question of developments in relations between Thailand and French Indochina. He referred to the fact that when he had called on Mr. Hornbeck on this subject Mr. Hornbeck had made to him certain observations as expressive of his personal view. Mr. Butler asked whether I was in position to comment. I said that, without undertaking to speak as under express directive from higher officers, I would give him my understanding of what I thought the official attitude and position of this Government would be.
I then proceeded to inform Mr. Butler that some months ago, when developments in relations between Thailand and French Indochina appeared first to be growing acute, the Department had instructed the American Minister at Bangkok to make certain comments to the appropriate officials of the Thai Government in reference to certain statements which those officials had made to our Minister. I said that our approach revolved around the principles set forth in Mr. Hull’s statement of July 16, 1937,52 and that we at that time had expressed the view that the question of relations between Thailand and any other country should be based on those principles. I said that subsequently we had expressed the same view to the Thai Minister here and had also stated that it was our belief that the use by Thailand of military means to reclaim territory which now belonged to another [Page 216] country would serve to stimulate aggression and in the end would be likely to be disastrous to Thailand itself. I told Mr. Butler that I felt that this Government’s attitude and position would continue to be based upon the principles set forth in the Secretary’s statement of July 16, 1937.
Mr. Butler said that he would appreciate it if I would bring the foregoing matter to the attention of Mr. Welles with a view to obtaining an official statement of the attitude of this Government. I said that I would be glad to inform Mr. Welles and I repeated that what I had said constituted my understanding of this Government’s attitude and position.
- Nevile M. Butler, British Chargé.↩
- Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 325.↩