751G.92/60: Telegram

The Minister in Thailand (Grant) to the Secretary of State

113. The British Minister informed me late last night that he was called to the office of the Prime Minister yesterday and given a verbal reply to a message from Lord Halifax which was transmitted to the Prime Minister by the British Minister a few days ago. Lord Halifax’ message, he said, was to the effect that, while the British Government still advocate the strict maintenance of the status quo in Indochina, in the event of the extension of Japanese control over Indochina Thailand should feel compelled to come to an agreement with the Japanese in order to protect her interests, the British Government would expect Thailand to refrain from taking any action which would be prejudicial to the interests of Great Britain in this area such as the granting of permission to Japan to establish air bases in Thailand which could be used against British possessions. The Prime Minister requested the [Page 178] British Minister to inform Lord Halifax that as far as he was concerned and as long as he was in control of the Government, Thailand would respect British interests in this area and would not permit the establishment of air bases in Thailand by Japan.

The British Minister then outlined for my information the substance of the remarks of the Prime Minister who, he said, was remarkably frank throughout the conversation. The Prime Minister said he is of the opinion it is “a 200 to 1 bet” that within a year Japan will have complete control of Indochina and that such being the case Thailand must protect her national interests by “coming to terms with Japan” in order to acquire the larger territories of Laos and parts of Cambodia in Indochina which formerly belonged to Thailand. The Prime Minister added that up to the present time Thailand had made no deal with Japan and there is no military alliance. In reply to the inquiry of the British Minister as to what Thailand proposed to do about the “new order” in East Asia, the Prime Minister said he was unable to make comment now since he did not understand just what the new order means. The Prime Minister said that the only solution of the problem of East Asia is the formation of a bloc of powers consisting of Great Britain, the United States and Holland to oppose Japan. Nothing else would suffice. He said he hoped to acquire from Vichy the frontier territory on the west bank of the River Mekong without using force.

Foregoing sent to Tokyo, Shanghai, Hong Kong.

Since this latest action of the British Government, which I have good reason to believe was prompted by the British Minister, appears to mark the climax of the British policy of appeasement in connection with Indochina, which as I have pointed out previously to the Department left us to fight alone the battle of the strict maintenance of the status quo in Indochina resulting in allegations in Thai official circles that the British were sympathetic and friendly and we were unsympathetic and unfriendly towards Thailand, I made the following observations to the British Minister:17a

“Sir Josiah, you have been here a long time, you and your Government have enormous influence here. I believe that you underrate your ability to influence the Thai leaders in the right direction in this matter which is of such great importance to your country and mine and to Thailand. You could give them sound advice which should have great weight. In my judgment the British admission to the Thai, that it may become necessary for Thailand to come to an agreement with Japan concerning Indochina, will only encourage such action. I believe that Lord Halifax has made a serious mistake and that you British will live to regret it. I fear that you are planning another Munich. If the Thai come to terms with the Japanese, as the Prime [Page 179] Minister suggests, that implies a deal between them which means that Thailand will give something in return for what she gets from Japan and that probably means ultimately the domination of Thailand by Japan, the establishment of a puppet government by the Japanese, and in such case, I ask, of what value is the Prime Minister’s promise not to take any action that would be prejudicial to British interests in this area? The promise, it seems to me, is likely to prove worthless and it will not be long before you will find Japan moving on into Malaya and Singapore and the East Indies. I recall Manchukuo. I believe we might accomplish something here in Thailand to prevent Japanese aggression, your Government and mine, if we could stand firm and shoulder to shoulder in the effort to keep Thailand out of this affair. I do not believe we should give up one of the front line trenches until it becomes absolutely necessary to abandon it.”

In reply the British Minister said that while he understood and appreciated my viewpoint he must be realistic, that it is imperative that Great Britain keep her friendship with Thailand because of vital interests in close proximity to Thailand which is not the case with the United States. He said that when the Thai Prime Minister had pointed out that the only solution was a bloc of powers consisting of Great Britain, the United States and Holland capable of using force, if necessary, against Japan, he was floored. He had no answer since his country could do nothing out here now because of the struggle with Germany. Thailand wanted protection and was entitled to it if she was to stand up against Japan. I interrupted to observe that Thailand, it seemed to me, since she is an independent country, was also obligated to make a friend of Japan. In connection with my reference to Manchukuo the British Minister said his Government had made many blunders.

Grant
  1. Sir Josiah Crosby.