751G.92/52: Telegram
The Minister in Thailand (Grant) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 5—4:30 p.m.]
103. As the result of a conversation with the Prime Minister this afternoon which continued for one hour and a half I am convinced that the military and political leader of Thailand is virtually a prisoner and certainly a puppet of a military clique which has the power and is determined to use force if necessary at the appropriate time in order to get what it wants in Indochina, in conformity of course with the Japanese program. I believe that the Thai plan of expansion contemplates more than the two small sections of frontier territory on the west bank of the river Mekong. That is the entering wedge. The offensive will take place when the Thai military group receives the “all clear signal” from Japan. It may come therefore within a few weeks or there may be considerable delay. Meanwhile the negotiations will be continued with Vichy primarily for the consumption of the democratic nations, particularly the United States.
The men behind the scenes in the Foreign Office are staging this show. The Prime Minister is told what to say and do. If and when the military action takes place the Prime Minister and Commander in Chief of the army will be cast as the hero of the military show. While I talked with the Prime Minister in his private residence, army officers, whom I could see through the open door into an adjoining room, listened to our conversation. He appeared to be very heavily guarded and under military surveillance. The Prime Minister said the people and particularly the army officers were demanding action and in an unguarded moment, which is common to these Thai, he added that “they might kill me if I do not follow their desires.” Since the purge last November and subsequent attempts on his life, the Prime Minister has rarely shown himself in public and has his wife prepare all of his meals. I believe the military clique is waging a war of nerves on him, that this mild mannered man is in the firm grip of his own ambitious army and navy officers and that Japan looms in the background of the whole business. I said to the Prime Minister that I had heard recently on reliable authority that Japan intends to take over ultimately all of Indochina, but that she will let Thailand have the large [slice of?] Laos and perhaps a small slice of Cambodia above the southern seaboard. He replied with a smile that he would be very glad to receive Laos. I inquired, “From Japan?” He replied, “Yes, from anyone.” In reply to my observation that perhaps his country would have a better chance of reclaiming territory to which it believes it is entitled upon the conclusion of the war around a conference [Page 165] table if restraint and the determination not to use force under any circumstances could be put into practice now, he inquired if I could cite any precedents of a nation which had received territory other than by the rise [use?] of force. This remark is the key to the man’s political philosophy. He is totalitarian. If he ever had any democratic principles, which I doubt, he has abandoned them completely. But he is only cast in the role of military dictator. A powerful group of his officers constitutes [the?] dictatorship.
I began the conversation with the Prime Minister by citing reports which have been received from officials and observers on the outside to the effect that Thailand appears to be contemplating military action in Indochina in collaboration with Japan, the circulation of pamphlets and maps in Thailand pertaining to the Thai claims, the recent clashes on the Thailand–Indochina frontier, the editorial expressions in certain Bangkok newspapers advocating the use of force if necessary. I said it appeared that an alarming situation may be developing and that it was not surprising therefore that public opinion in many countries including my own was turning its attention to Thailand and things were being said that the Thailanders did not like. I pointed out that the public would not take into consideration whether the territory desired by Thailand was small or large or whether the claim was advanced previously in the negotiations with France. There was a psychological factor in the matter which it appeared the Thailanders were overlooking, that to put it bluntly the Thailanders’ “timing of the affair” was bad in my judgment, that no amount of explaining of the details would correct the impression that was forming to the effect that Thailand was about to participate with Japan in an act of aggression and that there was only one thing that would correct this impression and that was a public statement by the Prime Minister to the effect that under no circumstances would Thailand resort to force in Indochina. I suggested that in my opinion the Prime Minister had a splendid opportunity to add to his laurels as an outstanding statesman by adopting such a course of action.
The Prime Minister observed that he was faced with a popular demand for the return of the territory. I countered with the suggestion that the Prime Minister as commander of the army and political leader of his country could lead public opinion. He replied that he had always studied and then followed public opinion. I inquired if the majority of the Thai people wanted the territory in Indochina returned. He answered in the affirmative. Of course this is nonsense and no one knows it better than the Prime Minister for the overwhelming majority of these people are too poor and too illiterate to know or care anything about the territorial questions. Public opinion in Thailand is restricted to a small group of intellectuals and the army and [Page 166] navy officers. I pointed out and emphasized the possibility of Thailand’s involvement in hostilities through military intervention in the Indochina affair which might bring misery and misfortune to all of the Thai people which would more than counterbalance the advantages of assisting the Thailanders now residing in Indochina. The Prime Minister, rather lamely I thought, said he did not contemplate the use of force but when I asked him if that meant he would refrain from using force under any and all circumstances he avoided making a direct reply, explaining that there would not be any immediate action, which leads me to believe that the Thai action in Indochina depends entirely on Japanese plans. I inquired as to the purpose and accomplishments of the Thai military mission to Japan. He replied “Good will only”.
I asked the Prime Minister for his opinion in regard to the meaning and effect of the Japanese pact with the Axis Powers. He indicated he had no comment. I then asked what his country would likely do in the event that Japan in conformity with the terms of the pact should attempt to dominate East Asia. He replied that Thailand could do nothing. In reply to my inquiry as to what he as a military leader thought of the progress and outcome of the war in Europe, the Prime Minister expressed the opinion that Great Britain could not win the war alone. The Prime Minister said he had received information from several sources that the Japanese plan to move through Indochina to Burma, cut the Burma Road supply and [isolate?] China in the southwest. This confirms information given to Ambassador Johnson by the Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs which has been reported to this Legation.
In conclusion I said to the Prime Minister that I wanted him to know that my Government in adopting its policy advocating the strict maintenance of the status quo in this general area is not unfriendly or unsympathetic towards Thailand, that it sincerely believes that such a policy is for the general welfare of all nations including Thailand. The Prime Minister thanked me. He had previously remarked that Great Britain seemed to be sympathetic in connection with the Thai claims in Indochina and I had replied I understood that matter and I thought I could say without fear of contradiction that regardless of any assertions by the British, the British Government and its representatives are just as much concerned over the possibility of military action on the part of Thailand in Indochina as we. (Reference is made to the Legation’s telegram 94, September 27, 10 a.m.12) The Prime Minister smiled and indicated that he held similar opinion. He was most cordial throughout the conversation and said he would think over what I had said to him. I am sure that he and his advisers [Page 167] of the Foreign Office are greatly desirous of retaining the good will of the United States and Great Britain and they are moving slowly and through diplomatic channels with this in view. I have no illusions, however. I do not believe that the Prime Minister and his advisers make the final decisions. When the military group decrees that Thai troops shall march, they will march and Japan will provide the cue.
- Not printed.↩