751G.94/130: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 20—2:09 p.m.]
591. My telegrams numbers 544, September 11, 7 p.m., and 589 of today. Chauvel also handed me this morning a 7-page memorandum [Page 132] by Baudoin in defense of French policy in the Far East since last June. This memorandum is based, said Chauvel, on my comment to him along the lines suggested in the Department’s 440, September 9, 6 p.m. (see my telegram No. 544, September 11, 7 p.m.) and upon statements reported to have been made by the Secretary to Ambassador Henry-Haye on September 11. A full summary follows:
The problem of relations between Indochina and Japan during the past 3 months has not been “of an academic nature”. The threat of the Japanese invasion of Indochina was made on June 13 and repeated on August 2. It was a question of knowing as a practical matter whether it was possible to avert this menace by negotiating with Japan and in case this negotiation failed of knowing what means France had to face an aggression.
The 15th of June France was facing difficulties which threatened unforeseeable consequences for her Empire. The possibilities for the defense of Indochina were very uncertain. The British Government with all its attention concentrated on Europe was obviously in no position to reenforce our possibilities of defense. The only effective help would have been that of the United States. The 18th and 19th of June, informed of the situation by the French Ambassador and asked as to the attitude which the American Government would adopt in case of Japanese aggression against Indochina, the Under Secretary of State replied that the United States, not believing it in its power, given the general situation, to enter into war with Japan could do nothing laisseraient [faire]). In the course of the conversation M. de Saint-Quentin mentioned the possibility of closing the frontier. Mr. Sumner Welles showed with respect to this suggestion neither surprise nor any particular emotion. Consequently the Governor General of Indochina proceeded to close the Indochinese frontier, agreed to receive at Tongking a Japanese control commission and to envisage the opening of commercial negotiations designed to favor the development of trade between Indochina and Japan. The British, for the same reason, some days later proceeded to close the Burma frontier to certain traffic. These measures had the effect of averting the Japanese menace for a few weeks. The threat reappeared with increased vehemence following the formation of the Konoye Government. In fact, on the 2nd of August the new Foreign Minister, Monsieur Matsuoka, stated to the French Ambassador that the possibility of carrying out operations against Chiang Kai-shek across Indochinese territory was considered by the Japanese General Staff as a vital necessity, that the Japanese Government demanded that the French Government permit the passage of its armies and that it would, with regret, in case French agreement should be delayed, see its armies force their way. At the same time the last report [Japanese Government] expressed its desire that its nationals in Indochina be accorded treatment equal to that of Frenchmen.
At that moment if the French military forces in Indochina were not in principle affected by the clauses of the armistice of June 25 it was nonetheless evident that the German authorities could, in practice, present demands of a nature seriously to handicap their means of action. [Page 133] Great Britain had proceeded to a regroupment of its forces whose cooperation with French units could no longer be counted on. Finally, placed au courant on the 5th of August by the French Ambassador of the Japanese demands with respect to Indochina and advised of the fact that French resistance to these demands would depend in large measure on the nature and effectiveness of the possible support given by the American Government, the Department of State handed on August 6 to Monsieur de Saint-Quentin a reply which recalled the position of principle adopted by the Government of the United States with respect to developments in the Far East but which made no mention of practical measures designed to give to that position concrete results in the presence of an immediate threat.
This negative indication was several times later reiterated. The 17th of August the Minister for Foreign Affairs having summoned the Chargé d’Affaires of the United States to inform him of the Japanese demands and even the terms of the instructions given M. Arsene-Henry on the entire negotiation, Mr. Murphy stated that in the present circumstances it would be vain to expect from the American Government anything other than a verbal condemnation of Japanese initiatives. On the 21st of August Mr. Sumner Welles informing M. de Saint-Quentin of the report of this conversation made by Mr. Murphy stated that the Department of State understood the position of the French Government and since the United States was in no position to come to its aid, it did not believe that it had the right to orient [reproach] the French Government for according military facilities to Japan.
Convinced that henceforth it could not expect practical assistance from Washington which would permit it to resist Japanese aggression, the French Government devoted its efforts to finding a formula designed to avert the threat without compromising any of its rights.
To that end it made known to the Japanese Government that any demand presented under the form of an ultimatum would be ipso facto considered as not acceptable; that on the other hand it would not refuse an exchange of views in the diplomatic sphere without pressure of any sort.
The Japanese Government having agreed to return to normal procedure endeavored to obtain from the French Government blanket authorization, without definite provisions, to pursue its operations against Chiang Kai-shek across Indochina. It at the same time attempted to force the admission as a basis of economic negotiations of the principle of equality of treatment (between French and Japanese) claimed at the outset.
These two demands were dropped. In conformity with the instructions which Mr. Murphy was called to take note of on August 17th, the French Ambassador at Tokyo insisted upon obtaining:
Formal assurances that the Japanese Government would agree to respect the political status and the territorial integrity of the Indo-Chinese Union; the renunciation by the Japanese Government in the military field as well as in the economic field of any blanket authorization, and acceptance of technical negotiations with respect to the [Page 134] same objectives; the Japanese acceptance of exact limitations in space and time of the military facilities demanded.
The Japanese Government agreed, not without difficulties, to sign these different undertakings which were made the subject of an exchange of letters on August 30th. In conformity with the stipulations of this agreement military negotiations began immediately at Hanoi.
From the second of September the Commanding Officer of the Japanese delegation presented to the French negotiator an ultimatum under the terms of which, if the French authorities refused a very general formula which offered no guarantee, the Japanese troops would enter Indochinese territory on the morning of the 5th.
This ultimatum was purely and simply refused. The matter was brought to Tokyo’s attention and General Nishihara was disavowed by his Government.
The negotiations were then renewed at Hanoi and are still in progress.
The French Government has been careful to keep the American Government informed of successive developments in this affair.
The American Government appears to regret today that the French Government agreed to recognize, while trying to limit its scope, a de facto situation which was forced upon it. It recalls on this occasion that it had manifested in the course of démarches made by Mr. Grew to the Gaimusho the interest which the United States has in the lot of French Indochina.
The positions of principle recently [publicly] taken on different occasions by foreign powers have not prevented Japan from occupying and organizing Manchukuo; more recently they had not prevented the development of the Sino-Japanese war, the closing of the Yangtze to navigation, the extension 01 the blockade along the coast of China, et cetera.
In the light of these precedents it is permissible to feel that similar declarations would not have sufficed to halt a Japanese attack on Indochina nor once this was carried out to persuade Japan to evacuate conquered territory. Since the only power in a position to intervene effectively in the Far East made it known to the French Government that it was not in a position to do so, either by affording naval support or supplying war matériel immediately necessary or in any other way, the latter could not but consider itself justified in defending its position by adopting the only line of conduct which took into consideration the factual situation with which it was faced.
At a luncheon given by him today exclusively to American newspaper correspondents in Vichy, Monsieur Baudoin, I am told, reviewed at some length the situation as outlined in his memorandum above and evinced little hope that the Japanese would be kept out of Indochina. He expressed the wish that these correspondents make clear the position of the French Government with respect to Indochina to the American public.