751G.94/88: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:48 p.m.]
544. I took occasion this morning to communicate the substance of the Department’s telegram No. 440, September 9, 6 p.m. to Chauvel and endeavored to emphasize the unfortunate effect which present French policy in the Far East is having in the United States. Chauvel was visibly impressed and I believe plans at least to transmit some explanation of the French Government’s position either through me or the French Embassy at Washington. He stated that Ambassador Grew’s representations had been decidedly helpful but that unfortunately they had been made too late. The French Government, he said, when the question first arose in June had through Saint-Quentin [Page 110] informed us of its critical position in the hope that our Government might then make some démarche. As he recalled it, Saint-Quentin had telegraphed that he had been informed by the Department that we were unable under the circumstances “to assume any additional responsibilities in the Far East”. Faced then with “this indication that we could render no tangible assistance” and the fear that a firm attitude on the part of France in the Far East would result in the loss of a few more departments in metropolitan France by action at Wiesbaden, the French “alone and helpless” had decided to admit in principle the possibility of Japanese troop passage through Indo-China in the hope of restricting the scale and duration of facilities to a minimum.
In reply to my question he freely admitted as he has before (my telegram No. 438, August 27, 7 p.m.) that the Germans have as yet taken no position whatsoever on the situation in the Far East. The French know however that there has been a complete exchange of information between the Germans and the Japanese and the possibility of German pressure still remains.
The situation has improved now, Chauvel said, partly because of the presence of Chinese in force on the Indochinese border, partly because of our stronger attitude and for other reasons. The Japanese he said are showing themselves each day more “acquiescent” to French suggestions and the French are accordingly increasing their demands for safeguards and restrictions. The Japanese are agreeing to limit the number of troops crossing through Indochina—not the total number passing through but the number to be on Indochinese territory at any one time and the area of transit. They have also reduced their demands with respect to use of airdromes and have expressed willingness to permit a certain control thereof by the French. As you are probably aware, the Japanese did cross the Indo-Chinese frontier near the Yunnan Railway but promptly withdrew.
The military agreement referred to in my telegram No. 496, September 5, 6 p.m. has not yet been reached though negotiations are proceeding smoothly. No discussion has commenced with respect to the economic accord. Chauvel who was somewhat hazy on the point said that he understood that any such agreement would involve a complete change in the French customs system: at present the Indo-Chinese customs régime is assimilated to that of France. Any compliance with the Japanese demands—”and they want everything”—would require the extension of rather complete autonomy to the Indo-Chinese Government which the French are reluctant to grant.
In the past few days, said Chauvel, the Thailanders acting on Japanese propaganda reports of the agreement with the French have made as they do periodically their own territorial demands on the Indo-Chinese Government. The French have informed the Japanese [Page 111] that if the recent political agreement respecting the integrity and sovereignty of Indo-China is to mean anything they expect the Japanese in view of their influence in Thailand to urge the Thailanders to abandon their demands—demands he said which were openly encouraged by the Japanese Military Attaché at Bangkok. Chauvel added that the French Minister at Bangkok had been instructed to inform our Minister and through him the British Minister.
In conclusion Chauvel reiterated that the political agreement referred to in my telegram No. 496, September 5, 6 p.m., was entirely dependent upon reaching military and economic accords: if the latter are not completed, the political agreement will fall to the ground.
I feel that your message should have some stiffening effect on Chauvel at least. Whether it will influence his chief in any way I cannot say.
(In conversation with Heinzen of the United Press yesterday—my telegram No. 534, September 10, 4 p.m.73—Baudoin brought up the Far East. He told Heinzen that he had asked our Government whether we would give any help to France if the Japanese attacked Indochina and that our reply through Saint-Quentin had been a prompt and categoric “no”.)
- Not printed.↩