852.48/793: Telegram
The Ambassador in Spam ( Weddell ) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 30—5:15 a.m.]
687. I had this noon a 2-hour audience with the Chief of State in an atmosphere on Franco’s part of great cordiality, almost approaching warmth. In the course of the conversation I informed him that the Government of the United States was profoundly interested in the economic rehabilitation of Spain and fully recognized its present [Page 840] difficulties. However, in view of recent events inter alia the exchange of visits between Spanish and German statesmen my Government felt that it was necessary for Spain to clarify its attitude concerning aid to the Axis Powers in order that the American Government might be in a position to justify itself to American public opinion before proceeding with its original intention of placing at the disposition of Spain through the American Red Cross certain quantities of wheat or undertaking to consider the possibility of the extension of credits for the purchase of raw materials in the United States.
To this Franco replied that Serrano Suñer’s first visit to Germany was made with a view to exchanging opinions and impressions along many lines including Africa; however he gave no indication of the content of the discussions. He stated that he had been invited by Hitler as a result of Suñer’s visit to meet Hitler at the frontier where discussion was continued between the two Chiefs of State.
Inquiry as to the reason for Suñer’s second visit the Caudillo said that conversations had been along general lines and with a special view to clearing up statements made to the Spanish Ambassador at Berlin by Ribbentrop44 which conflicted with those made to their Ambassador in Paris by Laval.45 I asked the flat question whether Spain had signed the Three Power Pact.46 He said it had not; that it was not a pact which affected Spain. He also remarked that he looked on the Three Power Pact as a pact of peace.
I then gave him the background of our Government’s present attitude and especially of our [aim?] and intention to aid Great Britain in the present war, which made it essential that we justify to our public, which was something to be reckoned with in a democracy, any help which we might give to Spain.
Franco remarked that America’s foreign policy seemed to be based on the belief that Great Britain would win the war, while in Spain they thought otherwise; he later modified this viewpoint by suggesting that it would probably be a drawn battle.
With regard to relations between Spain and the Axis Powers Franco emphasized the gratitude and loyalty which Spain naturally felt to the two countries which had helped it overthrow the Red regime. He then went on to point out the fact that Germany had some 250 idle divisions a considerable number of which he said were on the Spanish frontier “through no fault of Spain” and concluded by saying “no one can foretell the future”.
[Page 841]He then turned to the general question of help from the United States emphasizing its complexities. I remarked that admitting its complexities I felt that between the two Chiefs of State a formula might be worked out to meet the situation especially when a personal and private guarantee was an essential point. To this he remarked textually “it would be quite impossible for me to attempt to deceive such a man as President Roosevelt”.
I then asked Franco whether I might inform my Government that:
- (1)
- Spain does not envisage (which latter word I translated slowly and repeated conspicuously as “contemplar” and “preverse”) any departure from its present international attitude.
- (2)
- Nor does it contemplate any aid to the Axis Powers.
To the foregoing he assented but immediately thereafter he repeated an observation made on a previous occasion that Spain could not help the Axis Powers if it wished and that no one could foresee what the future might bring forth.
I then told him that his statement would be faithfully submitted to my Government for its information and important interest.
The impression left on me by Franco’s remarks is that he is keenly alive to the difficulties now facing his Government and that this view is shared by Suñer. Equally I feel that while he has weakened in his original belief in German victory as has Suñer that he has a real fear of what might happen to Spain through German action. I further feel that nothing more specific than the foregoing can be obtained from Franco; that it meets the Department’s conditions; and I therefore urge that the Department accept it as adequate.
I now propose to call on the Foreign Minister to inform him of the substance of my conversation with the Caudillo. I shall inquire whether the Minister will undertake to give the formal assurances of exports distribution as set forth in the Department’s 243, October 4, 6 p.m., and if possible I shall also ask him to approve the text of the proposed announcement as contained in the Department’s telegram of October 18, 3 p.m., number 257. I shall make it clear that nothing is yet definite but must await word from Washington.
- Joachim von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Pierre Laval, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers.↩
- German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Pact, signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940; for text, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 165.↩