840.48/3553: Telegram
The Ambassador to Poland (Biddle), Temporarily in France, to the Secretary of State
Angers, May
10, 1940—1 p.m.
[Received 7:40 p.m.]
[Received 7:40 p.m.]
For Hoover18 from Gibson.19 In the present situation I feel you should have conclusions drawn from my discussions so far.
- 1.
- British clearly determined to prevent if possible any general relief for Poland because (a) in the light of growing pressure for tightening blockade unwilling to make any avoidable exceptions, (b) reluctance to create precedent which might be invoked for feeding of other countries overrun by Germany, (c) reluctance to grants which [Page 762] might create similar precedents, (d) idea that political developments may prevent shipments through Mediterranean ports and leave nothing beyond shipments from Balkans which create no precedent and served only to absorb supplies which might otherwise fall into German hands.
- 2.
- Attitude toward blockade and distressed populations characterized by toughness unknown in last war. Antagonism to relief even in unofficial circles on ground (a) hard-boiled belief that suffering populations will exert definite pressure on Germany, (b) belief that current German behavior in Poland such they cannot permit foreigners freedom of movement.
- 3.
- Both British and French Governments weak and in no mood to take courageous action on relief. This may, of course, be subject to rapid change.
- 4.
- Polish Government badly divided and lacking in firm decision. President and Foreign Minister doing their best to secure vital action.
- 5.
- British have communicated impossible conditions alleging they are imposed by French. Latter deny this. Present plan Polish Foreign Minister secure firm denial from French and then proceed London if possible with French support for show-down. First step planned for today may be held up by military developments. [Gibson.]
Biddle