881.01/93
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Henry S. Villard of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
| Participants: | M. Paul Guerin, Assistant Director of the Moroccan Railways |
| Mr. Murray | |
| Mr. Ailing4 | |
| Mr. Villard | |
| Mr. Childs |
M. Truelle of the French Embassy telephoned Mr. Murray to make an appointment for M. Guerin who was stated to be in this country on a mission for the French Protectorate authorities in Morocco.
[Page 626]Mr. Guerin upon calling at the Department stated that the situation in Morocco had become quite acute from the point of view of the Moroccan Railways, as well as, of course, from the point of view of Moroccan economy generally. The Railways were without an adequate supply of coal, while there were no work shops in the country or in North Africa which might supply the Railways with equipment which had previously been imported from France or abroad. He had been commissioned to come to this country in order to arrange for a supply of coal, if possible, and he had been asked by M. Monick, Secretary General of the French Residency at Rabat, to look into other possibilities of exchanges of goods between Morocco and the United States.
M. Guerin was asked about the political situation in Morocco and as it related also to France. As a result of a series of questions put to him, he stated that Spain had gone into Tangier on June 12, 1940 to forestall an Italian occupation. Britain and France, of course, preferred Spain in Tangier for the time being at any rate to Italy or Germany, while Germany no doubt preferred to see Spain there rather than Italy. He thought that Spain would endeavor to bite off as much of Morocco as possible, profiting by developing circumstances. There were three lines of advance: (1) the obtainment of the old boundaries of the Spanish Zone which had been promised Spain at one time (1902) (we have had information that Laval is in negotiation with the Spanish looking to their satisfaction along these lines, which would mean but little more than a readjustment of existing boundaries); (2) the extension of the Spanish Zone by a considerably greater extent; and (3) the absorption of all of Morocco and the Department of Oran in Algeria by Spain.
M. Guerin thought that Germany would not permit Morocco to be absorbed under present circumstances by Spain, in as much as Germany itself had its eyes on Morocco.
It was mentioned to M. Guerin that there had been talk that Germany desired to return to the 1909–1911 period in Morocco when it endeavored to bring about a joint Franco-German economic condominium for Morocco. M. Guerin thought this was correct but he thought also that Germany had its eyes on air and naval bases in Morocco which would enable Germany (after the war if the war was won by Germany) to dominate that part of Africa and the Atlantic.
M. Guerin stated that the present situation made it extremely difficult for Morocco. The Railways were running out of coal, stocks of petroleum were running low, as also sugar and tea of which a great quantity was consumed by the natives, and the Moroccan tanning industry was threatened with collapse as a result of an absence of essential chemicals. He did not know what would be the outcome [Page 627] but he hoped that it might be possible to arrange for certain essential raw materials to be made available to Morocco. The possibility of social disorders could not be excluded if the situation grew worse.
He had succeeded in inducing the British to permit Morocco to obtain about 10,000 tons of coal at the present time from the United States, which would be shipped to Lisbon, there transshipped to Tangier, and exported into French Morocco from that port. This deal had been facilitated because the railways ran in part through Spanish Zone territory and because they had obligated themselves to make part of the coal available to the railways in that territory.
The question of shipping was difficult. There were no regular sailings between Casablanca and Lisbon nor between Tangier and Lisbon. There were occasional sailings of French vessels between Casablanca and Dakar and Casablanca and French metropolitan ports. He did not think that the transport of freight between the United States and Morocco in French vessels was practical as there was the question of navicerts and there was also the possibility that if French vessels attempted to make the run without navicerts incidents would be created with the British which would be unfortunate.
Questioned with regard to Weygand and the position in which he stood with respect to Pétain, M. Guerin stated that it must not be forgotten that Weygand’s loyalty as a soldier to Pétain was a matter of honor with him. It was unthinkable that Weygand would go against Pétain unless the former were released by the latter from his obligations.
- Paul H. Ailing, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.↩