851.248/427: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 20—9:05 a.m.]
1160. Chauvel94 asked me to call this afternoon and was in a state of considerable perturbation. He read me portions of a telegram from Henry-Haye concerning his latest talk with the Under Secretary. Henry-Haye telegraphed that “the State Department persists in subordinating the question of American aid in supplying airplanes for Indochina to a settlement of the question of Martinique and the airplanes on the Bearn.” Further on, after inquiring whether there are any “important reasons” why the latter matter could not be settled favorably, he again emphasized that “as has many times been made clear” the State Department according to his strong impression would take no action to help the defense of Indochina until the question of the airplanes on the Bearn has been settled.
Chauvel expressed first of all some annoyance at Henry-Haye. He said it was the first time that he had been given any indication that the question of our selling airplanes to aid Indochina was contingent upon disposal of the airplanes on the Bearn. He said that frankly he was perplexed as [to] just what [our?] position is. In the first place the situation in Indochina was one of extreme urgency. The French have again been cut from telegraphic communications with their Minister at Bangkok and he does not know whether it is the Thailandese or the British over whose cables such messages pass who are holding them up. While the whole matter of the airplanes on the Bearn is outside his field and he is not too familiar therewith, he does know that any negotiations with respect thereto with the Germans would take considerable time and any solution would be reached far too late to be of any help in the present emergency. It seems to him either that we are interested for our own reasons of policy in seeing the French maintain the integrity and independence of Indochina or we are not. If we are he hopes we can other way atmosphere95 to selling the 30 or 40 airplanes, antiaircraft, and antitank guns requested immediately. If we are not in a position to give this assistance the French will have to modify their policy, possibly accepting the Japanese offer of mediation which has just been rejected (please see Embassy’s telegrams numbers 1109, December 9, 5 p.m.,95a and 1141, December 15, 6 p.m.96). But they do want to know where they stand.
[Page 534]The second question which puzzled him was again (my telegram No. 1150, December 17, 5 p.m.97) that of the British attitude. Henry-Haye reported that on this question as on that of the transfer of the Senegalese troops from Djibouti and as “on all other questions today” the Department had consulted the British but had as yet received no reply. Looking at the question quite objectively he found it difficult to see just what advantage the British would have in hindering French defense of Indochina—he had seen no indications of any De Gaullist movement—but the indications seemed to point to the fact that they were (my telegram 1150, December 17, 5 p.m.).
The French Minister at Bangkok apparently felt that Crosby’s98 game is to bring about a situation of such chaos and unrest in Indochina that we would be compelled to intervene more rapidly in the Far East but he, Chauvel, is not inclined to believe this. He went on to say that whatever the situation he had asked me to call to emphasize the urgency of giving the French means to defend themselves in Indochina or at least of letting them know whether or not such aid may be forthcoming.
I said that frankly I was not au courant of what our attitude is with respect to the air planes on the Bearn and I could not therefore discuss the question in detail. I knew, however, that the matter was one in which not only our Government but also our public opinion is extremely interested. It seemed to me from past conversations (please see my telegram number 701, October 7, 7 p.m.) that the French Government has not been entirely frank with us on this question and has not clearly informed the Department of just what the situation is. I said that he and Monsieur de Seguin who joined us at that point insisted that the Germans would not permit the French either to cede or to transfer these airplanes but I wondered whether the question had ever been specifically taken up at Wiesbaden and whether Ambassador Henry-Haye had ever been instructed to explain clearly the French position. I urged that such an explanation be telegraphed Henry-Haye and this both Chauvel and De Seguin promised to do. The latter brought out a thin file and showed me a letter from the Minister of Colonies to the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated September 4, in which the former requested that the latter obtain through the French Ambassador at Washington authority and assistance from us in transferring the Bearn planes to Indochina as they were “urgently needed there”.
He likewise read me excerpts from a letter of Admiral Darlan99 to the Armistice Commission stating (1) that the planes in question after 3 months’ exposure to tropical weather were seriously damaged, (2) [Page 535] that their repair locally at Martinique was impossible and (3) that their re-embarkation was quite impracticable. In a third document dated October 19 Admiral Darlan stated to the Foreign Office the planes were completely useless (please compare Darlan’s statements to me—my telegram No. 1140, December 14, 8 p.m.1) and that the proposal to send them to Indochina should be abandoned. I told them that I understood from Murphy that our experts took an entirely different view as to the serviceability of the planes in question and, repeating that I was not familiar with the background, I said that it seems to me difficult to explain to Washington why the French had seemed so reluctant at least to broach the matter at Wiesbaden; that quite aside from any question of making the one matter “subordinate” to the other it must seem strange to the Department that while on the one hand the French urgently beseech us to give them assistance on a question in which they are decidedly interested, namely, the defense of Indochina, while at the same time they show no disposition apparently even to explain why they are unwilling to make any move on a matter which for one reason or another is of considerable importance to us. Chauvel thereupon dug up a note from the Armistice Commission meeting of September 20, in which is quoted a specific reply from the Germans refusing a French request to strengthen their defenses in Indochina by utilization of existing war material stocks in metropolitan France, North Africa, and “overseas”. The same reply, however, acquiesced in the French request for permission to purchase arms and war material for the defense of Indochina in the United States. In reply to the French delegate’s inquiry as to the reasons why existing stocks could not be used if new purchases could be made in the United States, the German delegate merely answered that he did not know; that the instructions came from Berlin. I gather that probably an account of this will be included in Chauvel’s telegram to Henry-Haye.
It would considerably facilitate my task in dealing with these and related questions if the Department could furnish me with such information as it feels it properly can on the following questions either for my confidential information or for background purposes: (1) Does it fit in with our policy and are we in a position to furnish the French with airplanes and other means of defense for Indochina? (2) Is the question of such aid in reality contingent, as reported by Henry-Haye, upon a “settlement” of the question concerning the airplanes on the Bearn and if so what is the “settlement” we desire? (De Seguin remarked that he found it difficult to understand why we should want French war vessels maintained at Martinique but the planes shipped out to Indochina.) (3) Does British policy favor assistance to the [Page 536] French in defending Indochina or do they feel that additional arms and armament may merely fall into Japanese hands?
- Jean Chauvel, Minister Plenipotentiary Second Class in the French Foreign Office.↩
- Sentence apparently garbled.↩
- Ante, p. 414.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Sir Josiah Crosby, British Minister in Thailand.↩
- Commander-in-Chief of the French Fleet.↩
- Ante, pp. 490, 492, paragraph beginning “Returning to Martinique”.↩