851B.20/9: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 8—11:55 a.m.]
701. My telegram 690, October 4, 7 p.m. Seguin sent for me this afternoon and said that night before last “he” had sent a cable to Henry-Haye setting forth the nature of the reply to be made to the President’s suggestions.82 Seguin said that as he understood it the President had raised three points: (first) he had suggested the “neutralization” of French possessions in the Western Hemisphere; (secondly) he had suggested the demilitarization of those possessions; and (third) that American observers be permitted to be stationed therein. (I have of course no way of knowing the accuracy of the foregoing but feel that the Department may be interested in having the impressions with respect to Martinique circulating in Vichy.)
With respect to the last he said Henry-Haye had been instructed to agree to the stationing of observers in French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique and Saint Pierre-Miquelon. They could be he said either [Page 525] military or naval officers but they should operate “very discreetly” and possibly might preferably be clothed as “consuls or vice consuls”.
As to demilitarization he said that France has in effect no fortifications worthy of the name in the Antilles (my telegram 688, October 4, 5 p.m.83). There are, he said, some 600 men stationed at Guiana, some 2,400 at Martinique and Guadeloupe and “four gendarmes” at St. Pierre-Miquelon. All these men were in reality needed he felt to maintain French prestige and order among the native populations and certainly could constitute no menance to anyone’s security. To this end Admiral Robert was being authorized to discuss any “demilitarization” in which we might be interested—if for instance the guns taken from the French auxiliary cruisers (my telegram 688) had been mounted so as to constitute any sort of threat—and his authority which already carried all but Saint Pierre-Miquelon would be extended to include those islands.
Seguin went on to indicate that under present circumstances local authorities such as Admiral Robert are given considerable leeway: “Cables do not arrive or are subject to revision et cetera” he hinted and he felt that as far as “practical considerations” were concerned we would find no difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory agreement.
“Neutralization” was, he said, the most difficult point. He did not believe as a matter of fact that real or complete “neutralization” would be really in our interest; we already had observers there and “neutralization[”] would imply a similar right for the Germans to have observers, which was obviously not what was wanted. I remarked that I supposed he was intimating that the Germans would resent such a move at the present time and the French were fearful of resultant reprisals or tightening of the German noose. He admitted that this was the case.
He said that while the foregoing had been cabled to Henry-Haye he had not in his cable gone into the question of neutralization “quite so frankly”. He said that the telegram had been sent off in a great hurry and should be regarded only as preliminary with room for discussions; it had been sent because he “was under the impression that events were developing with great rapidity these days”.
It is quite obvious to me that with the Government’s present policy of attempted collaboration with the Germans—or at least ready acquiescence in their suggestions—its leaders are inclined to make no move in the contrary direction regardless of the real sympathies of the permanent officials of the Foreign Office. Laval,84 for instance, seems to become daily less interested in the effect of his policies on American public opinion.