851B.00/19
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
With regard to Martinique, the Ambassador77 sought to assure us that they would preserve order in the French islands. I raised the question of the ninety airplanes out in the weather deteriorating on the island of Martinique which the French Government purchased from American manufacturers, and stated very earnestly to the Ambassador that, according to every rule of fair play and reasonableness, the French Government should turn these planes back to the American manufacturers and perhaps get the benefit of the forty or fifty million dollars that had been paid out for them. I said that this Government had gone far out of its way and denied its own needs almost to an extreme extent in order to enable the French Government to make this purchase and to aid it in its emergency war situation. Therefore, I must very emphatically request that the French Government take this step.
The Ambassador, in a somewhat apologetic tone, stated that he would take the matter up further with his Government and that he earnestly hoped something could be done. He then proceeded at length to elaborate on the binding nature of the armistice agreement with the German Government, which he said might interfere with the return of these planes. I remarked that it would be a strange thing if the French Government has gone that far in its armistice agreement, especially in the light of the relief needs of France. I stated that here there was at least forty or fifty million dollars worth of [Page 518] French property going to waste and never a more urgent need for money with which to buy foodstuffs and other needed commodities, while somebody suggests that to placate Germany or to give the narrowest construction to the armistice agreement, this vast amount of money should be thrown into the ash hopper or sinkhole. The Ambassador repeated that he would take this matter up in earnest. I stated that it was due him that he should know in this connection and in several similar connections where the question of the real attitude of his present Government towards Germany and towards Great Britain might come up, directly or inferentially, that his Government is anti-British primarily, and, in some respects going beyond all the requirements of the spirit or the letter of the armistice agreement, pro-German. I said I merely called this to his attention for the reason that as we go along this Government and the American people, responding to the ancient friendship that has always existed and to this day fully exists between the Governments and the peoples of the two countries, will be extremely desirous to do anything and everything at all practicable and reasonable for the French people in their terrible misfortune. Then I added that the American people, however, look on Mr. Hitler as the most devastating and all-pervading conqueror and destroyer within a thousand years and that there is no geographical limit whatever to his infamous plans and purposes; that, therefore, the people of this country do not propose to say or do one single thing knowingly that would aid or encourage him and his ruthless forces of destruction to the slightest extent. I said this feeling on the part of the American people began when they discovered that the French Government had signed away to Germany the entire French Navy, and after this country had aroused the hostility of Hitler by its every possible aid to France in her war emergency, it was impossible for the American people to understand why the French Government would hand to Mr. Hitler a loaded gun with which to shoot at their best friends; that I had emphasized this phase to the French Government for sometime before and until the last split second before they signed away their Navy to Germany; that, of course, we in this country could not possibly have been more deeply disappointed in the action of his Government.
The Ambassador made labored efforts to point out that the French fleet was sent to the African harbors where Germany could not reach it, and that all plans were made so that, in the event of any German attempt to get possession of it, it could either flee or scuttle itself, and that in no circumstances could Germany ever get it. To this I replied that no matter how good may have been the intentions of the French Government the theory that Germany could never get the French fleet was wholly fallacious. I then emphasized the point that the German [Page 519] power to prevail on the French to sign away their fleet for the period of the armistice would even to a more clinching extent enable Germany to require, and, if necessary, compel the French Government to turn over the French fleet, lock, stock and barrel, to Germany in the final peace agreement that Germany will write for her and France. I said that the fleet could not be more securely in Germany’s hands than it is now, and I should repeat the great disappointment that we feel in that respect; that, of course, when Germany comes to write the peace terms for France, probably its paramount purpose will be to secure possession and use of the fleet, and, of course, the French Government will feel far more obliged to sign on the dotted line and thus transfer the fleet, than when it signed the armistice and, regardless of the question of intention or desire, made certain its later transfer to Germany. The Ambassador never did attempt seriously to controvert or answer this statement.
At all stages I made clear to him the continued existence of the ancient friendship between our Governments and our peoples and of the earnest desire of my Government to be of any use at all reasonable or practicable to the French in their unprecedented misfortune with which everyone sympathized. I repeatedly made it equally clear that the American people are profoundly of the opinion that the French will have no really feasible way to recovery and restoration, except to a wholly inadequate extent, save through the halting by force of Hitler’s onward march of conquest, devastation and destruction; that, therefore, the people of this country observe with instant concern any reported act or utterance of other governments, including the French, which regardless of the actual facts, on their face, purport to be hostile to Great Britain in her struggle to check Hitler, or favorable and friendly to Hitler beyond any reasonable or legitimate requirements in the case of the French, of the armistice terms. They know in their own minds from past observation that there is no such thing as appeasing Mr. Hitler any more than a squirrel can appease a boa constrictor; that those poor little countries in Europe, with which the Ambassador is familiar, have had that identical experience; that this country is proposing to expend some 15 billions of dollars and organize a vast army on account of Mr. Hitler, and the French Government, of course, will realize that this is a most serious business for this country and its Government, if it has not realized it from its own experience and that of its neighbors.
The Ambassador appeared to take in the best of spirit these statements thus made to him and assured me that he would do what he could to clarify and clear up any and all questions presented.
- Gaston Henry-Haye called at the Department on September 11 to present his credentials as the new French Ambassador to the United States.↩