851B.01/6

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

The French Ambassador64 called to see me today at his request. The Ambassador told me that subsequent to our last conversation, he had at once transmitted to his Government by telegram the personal and unofficial suggestions I laid before him, namely, that in order to avoid the possibility of hostilities in the Caribbean, which would be a matter of grave concern to this country, the French warships now in or near Martinique might proceed to ports in the United States where they would be interned for the duration of the war, with the understanding that the British Government would agree to refrain from attacking or impeding the movements of these vessels on the way to the United States and would likewise agree not to interfere in any way with the government of Martinique and Guadeloupe, and with the further understanding that the airplanes on the French airplane carrier Bearn, which had been previously owned by the United States Government, would be returned to the private manufacturers from whom they had been obtained in order that they might then be released to the British authorities.

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The Ambassador said that there was now an interminable delay in receiving any reply from his own Government to his messages and that he had not yet received a reply from his Government in this question. The Ambassador said, however, that he himself had been thinking the matter over and discussing it with his Military and Naval Attachés and that he had now reached the conclusion—which was counter to the impression he had given me in our last conversation—that such a step on the part of the French navy would not be consistent with “French honor”. I stated that I could not see that the question of French honor was involved since the internment of warships in neutral ports was a practice well established and recognized by international law over a period of many generations and that it would certainly seem to me to be more in the interest of France to have preserved intact this portion of her navy until the conclusion of the war rather than to have it badly damaged or possibly destroyed by British warships. The Ambassador however insisted that the steps should not be taken since all that France now had left was her “honor intact”. I refrained from making the obvious reply to this statement.

The Ambassador then said that he had thought up another solution, however, and that was for the French Government to request the United States to send a commission of American naval officers to Martinique to take charge of the French warships in that port, with full authority to control the vessels in order that this might serve as a guarantee to the British that the French vessels would not fall into German hands until at least after the conclusion of the war. The Ambassador said that on his own initiative and without mentioning this to me, he had already telegraphed this suggestion to his Government. I stated that I would await such further word in this matter as he might have to offer.

Subsequently, in a telephone conversation with the President, I mentioned the new suggestion made by the French Ambassador and the President stated that he would be satisfied with either one of the two suggestions formulated.

S[umner] W[elles]
  1. Count de Saint-Quentin.