740.0011 European War 1939/7156: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Murphy) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 15—9:09 p.m.]
1140. Matthews lunched alone today with Admiral Darlan and his confidential aide at the latter’s request. In view of the importance of the Admiral’s position as Commander-in-Chief of the French Fleet and of his close association with the Marshal it is felt here his views merit reporting at length:
The Admiral opened the conversation by asking why we would not release some of the gold at Martinique for payment of French expenditures in South America including those for foodstuffs. We [He?] went on to express in detail his views on the situation and with respect to our policy. The Germans he said would probably win the war. He is completely convinced that the British can never win on the Continent though he does not anticipate their collapse. In any event the British Empire is finished. Canada and probably Australia and New Zealand will draw closer and closer to us; India will become independent as will South Africa and the former may well be the cause of a future war. This being the case the future of Europe will be governed by collaboration between the United States and France; for even if Germany wins the present war France will, given the strength and character of her people and German weaknesses, eventually be the dominating continental force—a view curiously enough shared by a number here. A German victory is really better for France, he said, in reply to a direct question than a British victory. In the latter case the British would certainly demand “much” of France—probably Madagascar and Dakar—and in the former case he believes Germany will take nothing but Alsace-Lorraine “which are lost anyway” and the Cameroons and British Nigeria. For the Germans, he said, realize that after all “they are not colonial administrators”. They will leave the rest of France’s colonial possessions untouched. He has had too [much?] experience, he said, with the British and “their dishonesty” ever to trust them. His family during previous generations was five times—and never by the Germans—ruined by the British and he himself has had enough experience with the British to know them thoroughly. He talked at length and with some feeling of the “imbecility” of the British High Command, of General Alexander’s “failure to protect the French rear at Dunkirk” in spite of British assurances, of Admiral Sir Dudley Pound’s ignorance, of the “drunkard Churchill who had crawled to him on his knees during 10 months only to turn on him at Mers-el-Kebir”. The only way to deal with the British he said “is to hit them on the head” and if the Marshal had let him “bombard Gibraltar after [Mers-el-Kebir?] there would have been no Dakar”. [Page 491] He himself would never again shake the hand of an English sailor. Laval had favored declaring war on the British after Mers-el-Kebir though he had opposed it, and in spite of his feelings it is quite possible that his Government’s future policy might again, for reasons of state, be pro-British. For the present he asked only that “the Anglo-Saxon countries leave him alone”. It is to our interest, he said, to have a strong independent French Colonial Empire because if there is any dissident movement in North Africa, it will be the Germans who will “arrive first” (he repeated this several times in the course of the conversation). He had given solemn assurances as had the Marshal that the French Fleet would never fall into German hands and he wished to repeat those assurances. In fact, he said he recalled the President’s message to him at Bordeaux last June to which he would gladly have replied with these assurances had it not been for the “threats contained in the last paragraph”. The same applied to naval bases in Africa. He added: “The Germans well know we are determined to defend both our fleet and our bases and they have accordingly made no request for them.” (Contrast Peyrouton’s statements—Embassy’s telegram 1116, December 11, 4 p.m.43). He had hoped the British would understand and he had talked frankly to Dupuy44 (Embassy’s telegram No. 1100, December 7, 2 p.m.45) but they “had proved so stupid in the past” that he could not overemphasize that if the British made further efforts against French colonial possessions, they would be quickly repaid. The same applied to the blockade. “They are being all right for the moment in letting supplies come through from North African colonies to metropolitan France though they stop occasional ships. If they insist, however, on a complete blockade, we may attack Gibraltar and with Spanish and German help the Rock wouldn’t hold out long.” (He said that the Germans have three divisions massed on the Franco-Spanish frontier and that matériel is already on Spanish trains—the gauge of Spanish railways as the Department is aware is broader than French.) He hoped that we would understand the wisdom of supplying France’s North African colonies with much-needed sugar and gasoline and avoid the necessity of seeking them from Germany. He had asked Dupuy to have a representative of the British blockade sent to Madrid for discussions but no action had yet been taken (telegram No. 1100, December 7, 2 p.m.).
[Page 492]Returning to Martinique, he said that upon Admiral Leahy’s46 arrival (and he was delighted he is coming) he was going to ask him whether we would not agree to exchange the two cruisers now there for two others as the former are badly in need of dry docking. As to the airplanes on the Bearn about which we asked, he said that all experts had agreed they were now “nothing but scrap iron”. In answer to a direct question, he indicated that the Germans and Italians had “refused” to allow the planes to be shipped back to the United States. He likewise said that they would not serve for use in Indochina for which colony he was hopeful we would sell France a few new planes. He was unable to understand why the British refused to permit the battalions of Senegalese to proceed from Djibouti to defend French Indochina.
He said he had nothing but admiration for the destroyer-naval base exchange47 which he characterized as “the greatest piece of business the United States had ever done”. He realized the great importance of those bases for our protection and said that “the age and quality of the destroyers, some of which he had seen at San Diego, proved to him the desperate position of the British in giving up those bases in exchange for such junk”. He knew, he said, that we had always cast longing glances at Fort de France and probably in the future “under other circumstances” France would be willing to cede us a base there but now, of course, given the German attitude, any such step was impossible.
As to the Italians “they are about finished; the end of the war may well see France holding Piedmont, and Germany, Trieste”. He does not believe the Germans wish to see the Italians forced out of Albania but doubts if they will lend much assistance beyond that point. As to Spanish claims on French Morocco, the Germans “are defending the French” against both the Spanish and against Italian claims elsewhere. The British “fool themselves” completely if they think their blockade is really bothering the Germans. The latter have “all the gasoline they want for instance as any trip to occupied France will show” and as German bombing raids against Great Britain have conclusively demonstrated. The British, he understands by the way, are running short of bombs.
He said that the Richelieu is in good condition to defend herself and that she will remain at Dakar. The Jean Bart will not be finished for some time. She lacks four of her big guns which cannot be mounted at Casablanca but he has no intention of moving her at present. He was proud of her trip from Saint Nazaire in June from which point she started at a speed of 4 knots and ended at 21 knots.
[Page 493]He was, of course, bitter about De Gaulle48 and the whole movement but would say nothing specific about any future effort to recapture the Tchad. He remarked with a wink that De Gaulle, however, had not been without usefulness, and quoted the Marshal as saying that “if he had not existed, he would have had to be invented[”]. (Please compare statements made to Dupuy as to the importance of keeping up, at least externally, Franco-British unfriendliness—telegram 1100, December 7, 2 p.m.)
In conclusion, he stated that he had spoken frankly as a sailor and emphasized that the Marshal held views identical to his: “Tell your Government that neither the French Fleet nor French bases will fall into German hands; that we will defend our colonies against all comers including the British, and if necessary the United States. Help supply our African colonies as well as France herself for that is to your advantage. And remember that France and the United States must collaborate in the future Europe whether there is a German victory or drawn peace—for the British can’t win on the Continent.”
We endeavored to impress upon him that we consider the British are fighting our war; that our own security is involved; that we believe the British will win thanks to our assistance in matériel; and we reiterated our great and natural interest in the French Fleet and the French colonies. He remained unconvinced on the question of British victory and skeptical as to the threat to our security—particularly with our new naval bases—of a war-weary Germany regardless of the outcome. He was in excellent humor except for the very real bitterness of his references to British “untrustworthiness and treachery” and cordial throughout. He said that while his remarks were frank and “free from Foreign Office protocol and red tape” he hoped that we would make his views known to Washington in the interest of better mutual understanding.
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Not printed; in this telegram the Chargé reported a conversation with Marcel Peyrouton, French Minister of Interior. The comment regarding the French Fleet was as follows:
“He said, quite inadvertently I think, during the course of the conversation which followed, that the Germans had made it apparent recently that they desired the delivery of the French Fleet. I asked whether this had been put in the form of an official request and he hastened to say no, but that they had made their intention quite clear. He said the French Government was united in opposition to the suggestion.” (740.0011 European War 1939/7082)
↩ - Jean Dupuy, Canadian Chargé in Vichy.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Appointed United States Ambassador to France November 22, 1940.↩
- See vol. iii , section under United Kingdom entitled “Negotiations for transfer of American destroyers…”↩
- Gen. Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French forces.↩