740.0011 European War 1939/7300: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 28—2:25 p.m.]
1185. It is perhaps surprising in the light of the recent wholesale expulsion of the inhabitants of Lorraine (and the continued expulsion of Alsatians: Sholes66 reports that two trainloads a day pass through Lyons) the refusal to grant more than the most shadowy concessions with respect to French war prisoners, and the many daily evidences of what Nazi domination means, that the Germans have recently succeeded to an important degree in certain French circles in selling their familiar doctrine: the new Europe can be but a simple choice between Nazi direction and bolshevism. This doctrine is being assiduously spread and increasingly accepted in the upper levels of French economic and social spheres particularly in the occupied territory. The influence of these elements under present circumstances is great. France has a Government which established itself on the ruins of a prostrate country by running with the strong tide of popular disgust with the leaders and systems which had brought her to her present plight; it is a Government which has neither a broad popular base nor as yet an effective centralized authoritarian organization. The weight of the large industrialists and of the aristocracy, with their emphasis on “order” rather than “freedom”, of the anti-popular front elements of “Cagoulard” fame, should not therefore be underestimated. Their argument runs that while the Germany of the postwar period will for a few years exercise an unpleasant and restrictive influence over French economic and political life, this unhappy period will soon be transformed by the resurgence of a strong new France. Those who accept this theory—and they are many—show a confidence in certain undefined and intangible qualities of French character which make it seem to them inevitable that they will soon outwit their blundering and less civilized German neighbors. While it is difficult to pin them down to any logical basis for this confidence—they point vaguely to France’s glorious past—the belief here is nonetheless real. The alternative they say is communism or chaos, and they believe they will save more for themselves from under the Nazi yoke than in a Red Europe on the Russian model. The majority of this class are convinced that a British [Page 431] military victory on the Continent is impossible but, admitting its possibility for the sake of argument, they say it can only be accomplished at the cost of a complete social breakdown in Germany which will soon spread over the rest of the Continent. The horrors forecast are reminiscent of similar nightmares depicted in 1918. These dangers will inestimably become more acute they say as the duration of the war is extended and destruction increases; an early peace and a drawn peace are therefore what France must strive and wish for, a peace in which France will have a certain arbitral influence. That is why any intimations that the early termination of the war is possible are greeted eagerly by these elements particularly in the occupied territory and that is why reports tending to play up isolationist sentiment in the United States, to minimize both the timing and amount of our aid to the British and to emphasize suggestions for sounding out peace possibilities, are carefully circulated by the D. N. B.67
I have dwelt on the foregoing at some length because it represents such an important body of thought within the French Government. As I have stressed in the past, the overwhelming majority of the French people fervently hope for a British victory and instinctively feel that such a victory is France’s only salvation. The strength of this feeling will in the future as it has in the past in the heyday of Laval restrain the Government from going too far along the path of Franco-German collaboration, but the Government itself stands more for early peace and “appeasement”.
Among those who hold the view described above—that France after a few unpleasant years of German control will somehow again be in the driver’s seat—is Admiral Darlan. Please see my telegram No. 1140, December 14, 8 p.m.68 This fact is important since the role of the Admiral following Laval’s elimination has become increasingly important. The Germans apparently prefer him to Flandin; they are well aware of his personal anglophobe sentiments, of his belief that Germany cannot be defeated and they like his blunt manner of speaking. It is not unlikely that they also regard him as something of a political babe in the woods and knowing that he enjoys the loyalty and devotion of “his” French Navy for the building and efficiency of which he was principally responsible hope that if carefully handled he may be “amenable”. (For instance from his conversation with me I believe that the Admiral would favor under certain circumstances forcible convoying of French supply ships or other direct action to break the British blockade of France.) While the Marshal and Admiral Darlan at least since the days of June have largely seen eye to eye on important matters and are friends of long standing, he is growing to enjoy I believe the Marshal’s increasing confidence. He is already [Page 432] spoken of as the new “Dauphin” and the man who would step into the breach should anything happen to the Marshal. At any rate he is at the present time coming to the forefront of the French political scene as the fact that he has twice been sent by the Marshal to Paris to treat with German leaders in the past week already shows.