300.115 (39)/665
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)
The British Ambassador came in today, at his request. After discussing certain other points (reported in memorandum of conversation [Page 20] of even date herewith24a), we then proceeded to a discussion of the Aide-Mémoire of February 8th, 1940, which he had handed to Mr. Welles. I stated to the Ambassador orally the substance of the memorandum a copy of which is attached. The Ambassador’s principal comment was confined to that part of the statement which referred to the Secretary of State’s suggestion that a system be worked out which would minimize interference with American commerce. He said that the Secretary had used, in conversation with him, the phrase “letters of assurance”. It is true that his suggestion contemplated meetings. Two such meetings had actually been had. A memorandum had been given by our people to theirs as to the bases of the Navicert system. No letter had been sent by the Embassy to us indicating that they did not accept these assumptions; the Ambassador thought it was a mistake not to have sent such a letter. The fact was that the assumptions had not been accepted. The establishment of the Navicert system had been done unilaterally, but it had been done because the Embassy had gained the distinct impression that the State Department did not wish to carry discussions further, since it did not wish to be in a position of agreeing to anything.
I confined myself to stating that this would have to be the subject of a further discussion covering the entire Navicert system.
At the close of the discussion I said that I had understood the Ambassador wished to keep his Aide-Mémoire confidential; that we would, however, in due time answer it with more complete discussion; that the object, of course, was not to have a dispute, but to get a result; and that I sincerely hoped that the results, namely, elimination of discriminations and delays and the like, would be such as to make reference to it unnecessary. On the other hand, without some such result our people felt that they were entitled to full information as to the status of affairs.
I added that there were a number of minor but unhappy cases which I thought we should have to discuss in the future. These, it seemed to me, were matters which we should be able to solve, since quantitatively they did not seem to me important. They related to the stoppage of German shipments which had already been paid for by our people; and to the refusal to permit passage of certain goods because they were supposed to be absolute contraband, which led to a controversy over a very small shipment of dental supplies to a European neutral because they contained rubber; and to the shipment from Germany of certain supplies of humanitarian and other articles of similar importance which could not be obtained elsewhere. I said that I did not wish to open this matter today, but that we should wish to get at it in the future.
[Page 21]Lord Lothian said that he fully agreed that these matters should be taken up and promptly settled, since he did not consider that they were of great importance practically.
As to the outgoing shipment of German goods, he noted that the principle applied to the date of the Order of [in] Council; goods paid for before that time he felt should be released, others not. I said that we naturally reserved our position that any blockade of outgoing goods was contrary to international law; but that in any case I did not think our people would feel themselves charged with knowledge of the date of the British Order in Council. In these cases the situation was that Americans had paid for materials; no advantage could accrue to the Germans, accordingly, from the shipment of these goods, and the only effect, therefore, was to inflict loss on our people. The Ambassador said that he agreed that was so, although the practice might grow up of paying for goods in advance and then insisting that the goods come through. I said that I thought few, if any, American business men were likely to pay for goods in advance and then take a chance on getting them out.
The only other observation of importance made was that I took occasion to emphasize that we understood the phrase in his Aide-Mémoire disclaiming any attempt to control “American trade or traders” must be taken to exclude any possibility of a black list; that our people were extremely sensitive in such matters. We had already had a situation in which Navicerts were issued for shipment to a neutral European, and made available to a number of American shippers but withheld as to one American shipper, which would seem to indicate that the objection was not to the consignee, but to the shipper.
Lord Lothian agreed that the only test was the consignee; though he said there might be certain cases of American shippers who were obviously enemy concerns, like the North German Lloyd. I said there would be no practical difficulty in the cases where the American shipper was very obviously an agent of the German government, but we could cross that bridge when we came to it. In general, I was glad to note their acceptance of the fundamental point of view that no black list would be undertaken as regarded American traders.
- Supra. ↩