340.1115A/715
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)
I talked with Admiral Stark58 several times on the telephone about convoy for the Roosevelt.59 The President had sent word to me through General Watson60 that he expected the matter to be solved through the Navy as it was an operating problem and the Navy Department was to make the decision. I presented the question to Admiral Stark on that basis and after consideration the Admiral called me back on the telephone and said that if we sent notice that the ship would sail fully lighted at night, would carry the American flag prominently displayed, and if we gave a general direction of her course, the dates of intended departure and probable arrival, and as much information as possible to the belligerent nations, he thought it was wiser not to convoy the ship and that she would be safer that way than with a convoy. He said he was unable to say that there were no dangers en route or near the coast of Ireland. They had not heard of mines recently in that neighborhood. However, there was always the danger of submarines and at least mistaken identity. Nevertheless he felt it wiser not to convoy the Roosevelt and so finally decided, although they had a ship ready and awaiting orders.
In the light of this conversation I read to him over the telephone the text of Department’s 941 of the twenty-second to London,61 which went also to each of the other belligerents, and he thought the text was adequate under the circumstances. After conversing with Admiral Stark, the message was dispatched.