761.94/1236: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 2—3 a.m.]
1466. For the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary. The new Japanese Ambassador91 made his first call on me yesterday. After stating that he had been instructed by Foreign Minister Matsuoka to speak frankly to me, he told me the following:
He saw Molotov late in the [day?] of October 30 and, as he put it, asked him point blank “Does the Soviet Union or does it not wish a ‘convention’ with Japan.” Molotov replied that the Soviet Government “was studying the matter”. The Ambassador told me that Japan has proposed to the Soviet Union what he described as a “convention” (probably a convention of friendship and nonaggression expressed in general terms) to be followed thereafter by negotiations dealing with specific points of difference between the two countries. These points of difference, the Ambassador stated, concerned the Sakhalin oil concessions, the recurrent fisheries dispute, provoking Outer Mongolian-Manchukuoan frontier conflicts and the support hereinbefore rendered by the Soviet Union to the Chiang Kai Shek regime. He said that about a year ago the Soviet Union had desired a political agreement first with negotiations of specific matters in dispute to follow, whereas at the present time his Government had the impression that the Soviet Union desired to discuss the specific matters in controversy first before committing itself to the conclusion of a political agreement. Insofar as concerns Sakhalin, the Ambassador said that Japan was ready to make concessions as the Japanese Army [and Navy?] need oil badly “because of the general attitude of the United States”. He said his Government was also prepared to make concessions in connection with the fisheries dispute and that he expected no difficulty at all in the delimitation of the Outer Mongolian-Manchukuoan frontier. He said his Government was entirely prepared to extend diplomatic recognition to Outer Mongolia, as well as to recognize Soviet special interests in Sinkiang and he assumed that in return the Soviet Government would be prepared to recognize Manchukuo. He said very frankly that the Japanese Government was extremely desirous of obtaining an agreement with the Soviet Union at the present time and was prepared to make substantial concessions to this end.
[Page 671]The Ambassador disclosed that his Government was primarily concerned with obtaining some form of public declaration from the Soviet Government of a cessation of Soviet aid to China for the political and psychological effect that such a declaration would have on the Chinese willingness to make peace. He stated that were such a public declaration to be made by the Soviet Union, the Japanese Government would not seriously object if moderate or limited amounts of munitions continued to be furnished to Chiang Kai Shek by the Soviet Union and added that Molotov had told him that Soviet aid to China had “virtually ceased at the present time”.
I gained the impression from everything the Ambassador said that what Japan desires more than anything else—and for which it is willing to pay a very considerable price—is some kind of a public declaration or general convention with the Soviet Union which the Japanese Government feels will have a powerful political effect throughout the world and will hasten the conclusion of peace with China.
On his parting from Molotov, the latter again assured the Ambassador that the Soviet Government was giving careful consideration to the Japanese proposals. The Ambassador said that he did not intend to press Molotov for an immediate answer but that he hoped and expected to hear from him in the near future. At one point in the course of our conversation, the Ambassador remarked that his Government considered that it could afford to pay a considerable price for what he continued to refer to as a “convention” with the Soviet Union, even if the Soviet Union did not thereafter “keep all of its promises”.
The Ambassador said that the Soviet Government had not yet furnished the Japanese Government with its desiderata and that neither he nor his predecessor, Ambassador Togo, had acquainted Molotov with the specific concessions which Japan was ready to make to obtain an agreement. When I asked him what he meant by specific concessions he said that the Soviet Government did not know as much as he had told me concerning the concessions Japan was prepared to make.
Insofar as concerns the present attitude towards China, the Ambassador said that in his opinion the Japanese Government would have to modify its demands of Chiang Kai Shek in order to bring about peace at the present time and that he had urged such modification on Matsuoka before his departure from Tokyo. It was obvious from the Ambassador’s entire conversation that he belongs to the more moderate army element and that he is of the opinion that peace between China and Japan should be effected as soon as possible even though the terms which the Japanese Army desires are not obtainable in their entirety.
- Lt. Gen. (retired) Yosnitsugu Tatekawa.↩