761.94/1230: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 23—7:25 a.m.]
1390. The British Ambassador told me last night in the strictest confidence that his Government had received a report from the British Ambassador in Chungking85 of an interview with Chiang Kai-shek in which the latter had informed the British Ambassador that the situation of China was becoming so difficult that the question of further resistance was in doubt and that if a Soviet-Japanese agreement were concluded with its implication of a cessation of Soviet aid, China would probably be forced to conclude peace with Japan. On the basis of the disquieting information Cripps has received instructions from his Government to see Molotov and inform him that the British Government feels that a Soviet-Japanese agreement at this time would be very undesirable as it would probably result in the collapse of Chinese resistance and that consequently should the Soviet Government find it necessary to make any such agreement the British Government hopes that it will rend [find?] it possible to eliminate any reference to or even indirect indication of the withdrawal of Soviet [Page 668] aid to China. The Ambassador’s instructions authorize him further to state that if the Soviet Government is prepared to adopt a policy of “genuine neutrality” and accord Great Britain the same treatment as has been and is being accorded to Germany, the British Government is prepared to give assurances that the Soviet Union will be consulted with respect to any further peace terms and the British Government will pledge itself not to conclude now or hereafter any anti-Soviet agreement with other nations.
The Ambassador stated that he had been endeavoring for a week without success to obtain an interview with Molotov in order to carry out these instructions and that yesterday he had “conveyed an ultimatum to Molotov” to the effect that unless he was received today he would be forced to see Bertram Hinsky [Vyshinsky?].86 (I did not regard it as desirable to disclose to the Ambassador that I have encountered similar difficulty in seeing Molotov.)
The Ambassador continued, however, that he had noted certain progress in his commercial negotiations with the Soviet Government in that the Soviet authorities after first offering flax in exchange for British rubber, tin and other commodities had recently agreed in principle to sell oil and munitions to Great Britain. The Ambassador admitted that Great Britain had no need for Soviet oil and that his insistence on this commodity had been due entirely to a desire to reduce deliveries of Soviet oil to Germany, whereas the munitions in respect of which only rifles have thus far been specifically offered by the Soviets could be advantageously turned over by the British to any friendly nation in the Near East, such as Turkey.
The reluctance of Molotov to receive the British Ambassador in my opinion confirms the views expressed in my 1307, October 8, 5 p.m., and 1373, October 20, 7 p.m.,87 as to the reasons for the difficulties which I have encountered in seeing him, namely, an intense desire by the Kremlin not to show even the appearance of negotiations with Great Britain or the United States. I am further of the opinion that pending a decision in respect of future Soviet policy at an admittedly delicate moment and especially following the German approach reported in my 1359, October 17, 12 noon, and 1379, October 21, 4 p.m.,88 the Soviet Government is anxious to avoid having political proposals, or even questions, put to it by the British Government which it is not yet prepared to answer.
Cripps also informed me that in reply to his vehement protest to Halifax concerning the unfortunate and possibly fatal effect of the publicity in respect of British-Soviet negotiations, particularly as he [Page 669] had given the Soviet authorities assurances that there would be no such publicity, he has now been assured by Halifax that the latter had personally taken steps to avoid a recurrence.