Office of the Historian

762.9411/103: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, October 7, 1940—10 p.m.
[Received October 7—7:02 p.m.]

954. My 929, October 2, 7 p.m. The following comments on the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the German-Italian-Japanese [Page 663] alliance and on other aspects of recent developments come from reliable sources.

1.
Prince Konoye was opposed to the alliance and fought hard against it to the point of threatening resignation in the face of the determination of the Foreign Minister and the War Minister76 to push the alliance through, so that the ensuing deadlock had to be taken to the Emperor. The matter was debated in the long Imperial Conference which preceded the final decision, the Emperor’s assent to the alliance having been finally obtained on the grounds that: (a) the danger of war with the United States was real, and (b) in the setting up of the new national structure the Japanese people had been led to expect dynamic developments and unless they were encouraged by some spectacular step there would be serious reaction against the hardships imposed on the nation. (The report in the final sentence of paragraph numbered 5 of my 916, September 29, 11 a.m.,77 now appears to have been incorrect.)
2.
The Emperor, however, made it clear that he was Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy and while supporting the army against the Premier he exerted his authority by vetoing the proposed appointment of General Terauchi as Chief of the Imperial General Staff and insisting upon the appointment of General Sugiyama,78 an officer of moderate leanings.
3.
In the ensuing dissatisfaction among extremists in the army there were even suggestions that it might be desirable for the Emperor to meet with an “accident” but these elements were restrained on the ground that neither the navy nor the rank and file of the army would tolerate an attempt at revolution affecting the sacred person of the Emperor.
4.
Whether the Emperor ordered the resignation of Prince Kanin as Chief of the General Staff of the Army in order to show his displeasure and to curb the extremists and to prevent their sheltering behind the Imperial rank of their chief is a moot question. If the current rumors of Prince Fushimi’s impending resignation as Chief of the Naval General Staff should prove to be well founded, strength would be given to the foregoing hypothesis.
5.
With regard to the alliance, a reliable Japanese formerly in high official position states that while he has not seen the actual document consummating the pact he has been given to understand that the provisions of article 3 are applicable only in case of unprovoked attack. Thus if the United States should go to war with Germany as a result, for instance of the sinking of American ships by German [Page 664] submarines, Japan would not be bound to go to war against the United States if Japan herself decided that the United States had acted under provocation.
6.
Mr. Toshi Go, editor of the Japan Times, today said to a friend that the statement of the Prime Minister in Kyoto on October 479 and other inflammatory official utterances against the United States were given out in mistaken belief that they would influence the forthcoming election in the United States by persuading the American people that the present administration was bringing the United States to the verge of war. Mr. Go himself, however, remarked that the foregoing belief represents a total misconception of American psychology and that the utterances mentioned would have an effect the reverse of that intended.
Grew
  1. Yosuke Matsuoka and Gen. Hideki Tojo, respectively.↩
  2. The substance of this telegram is printed in Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 169; the sentence under reference is the last one of the top paragraph as printed on p. 170.↩
  3. Both were former Ministers of War.↩
  4. See the Ambassador’s telegram No. 946, October 5, 5 p.m., p. 661.↩