761.62/815: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:46 p.m.]
1577. For the President, the Secretary, and the Under Secretary. My No. 1518, November 11, 4 p.m. The following information concerning Molotov’s conversations in Berlin has been obtained in the strictest confidence from the source referred to in my telegram under reference.
My informant stated that no conclusive agreements were reached in Berlin and that none had been contemplated. With respect to the background of the visit, he reiterated that while its primary purpose from the German point of view had been to publicly emphasize and reaffirm the continuation of Soviet-German friendship and cooperation it also had been a continuation of the talks in Moscow between the German Ambassador and Molotov. He explained that when Molotov had finally decided to go to Berlin, the Soviet Government had preferred to have him present directly to Hitler and Von Ribbentrop the specification of important Soviet aspirations and desires which the German Ambassador had, under instructions from his Government, invited the Soviet Government to present. He added that the German Ambassador would shortly resume his conversations with Molotov on the basis of the Berlin talks and before discussing the outcome of the Berlin conversations my informant pointed out that it was more than a year since there had been any personal contact between the Soviet and German Foreign Ministers, and that during that period far-reaching and fundamental changes resulting from German victories had taken place throughout Europe and the world and that, in consequence, it was desirable that a clarification of the respective positions of Germany and the Soviet Union be undertaken, especially in view of Soviet apprehensions and suspicions of Germany’s future intentions which had resulted from the actions of Germany in regard to Rumania and Finland and the conclusion of the tripartite pact.
My informant then continued to the effect that Molotov had gone to Berlin exceedingly well prepared and apparently with precise instructions as to the specific aims and aspirations of the Soviet Union in all parts of the world and had set them forth with great frankness and complete realism. Although my informant was unwilling to disclose the Soviet aims and aspirations in detail, he made it quite clear that they referred almost exclusively to territorial acquisitions and by implication indicated that they related to Finland, the Black Sea [Page 585] area, especially the Dardanelles, eastern Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and the Far East. He said that the character of the Soviet aspirations and the frankness with which they had been presented clearly revealed that the Soviet Government understood that under present conditions the only agreements of any value in international affairs were those providing for the acquisition of territories of strategic or economic importance. He said that Molotov had made an excellent impression in Berlin and that Hitler and other German officials had met his frankness with equal frankness and had made it quite clear to him that Germany was prepared to take into consideration any legitimate Soviet territorial aspiration in any part of the world. Although my informant again emphasized that no agreement as to territorial acquisitions or spheres of influence had been definitely agreed upon in Berlin, he said that each Government now thoroughly understood the interests and desires of the other and that as a result of the exchange of views in Berlin, any future negotiations with regard to specific areas of interest to either or both Germany and the Soviet Union would be facilitated and the task of reconciling any conflict of interests in any particular area would be greatly simplified. My informant added that the far-reaching nature of the conversations was best exemplified by the fact that they had dealt not only with the immediate problems arising out of the war but with matters affecting postwar settlements as well, such, for example, as the German intimation that while German troops would be stationed in Rumania during the progress of the war with England, it was very unlikely that they would remain there after the establishment of peace.
With respect to the Far East, my informant stated that Molotov had indicated clearly and definitely the terms on which the Soviet Union would conclude an agreement, which he described as far-reaching, with Japan and had asserted that if the Japanese desired such an agreement, they would have to “pay the price”. Although unwilling to disclose the exact “price”, my informant intimated that it called for specific territorial concessions which, he added, were entirely logical and consistent with the general lines of Soviet policy. He believes that the Japanese, under German advice, will accept. He added parenthetically that contrary to general expectation, China would not suffer seriously from any such Soviet-Japanese agreement. He does not anticipate any immediate developments in Soviet-Japanese relations since the negotiations may be complicated and continue for some time.
My informant said that in economic matters, the German Government, aside from an increase in Soviet grain deliveries to Germany, had not expressed a desire for any important changes in the existing economic agreement and that Molotov had discussed with Goering [Page 586] the delay in the delivery of certain German machinery and equipment to the Soviet Union. He added that economic matters had not played an important part in the six and a half hours of discussion between Molotov and Hitler. There was, however, one German desire in the economic field, namely, the continuation of German trade with the former Baltic States on the basis of the German trade agreements with those countries. He regards this desire as difficult of realization as he does not see how the Soviet Union can make so important an exception to its foreign trade monopoly in respect of areas which have formally been made an integral part of the Soviet Union.
My informant summed up the results of the Berlin conversations as follows: (1) the position of both countries has been sufficiently clarified to preclude any misunderstanding as to their respective interests and aspirations; (2) the German Government is now entirely confident that at least in the immediate future, the Soviet Union will continue its present policy of good relations with Germany and thus assure the latter tranquility on its eastern frontier and in the Balkans, which he characterized as still the main object of German policy in its relations with the Soviet Union; (3) there will be no change in the general line of Soviet foreign policy in respect of the war in the immediate future, and in this connection he stated that no attempt had been made in Berlin to induce the Soviet Government to abandon its position of technical neutrality or to adhere to the tripartite pact since Germany realized that any such attempt at the present time would be unlikely to succeed; (4) the establishment of a solid foundation for future collaboration and a basis for negotiations and joint consultations in regard to any specific area in the world of interest to both the Soviet Union and Germany, such, for example, as Turkey and the Black Sea area.
The foregoing information clearly indicates that although some definite agreement may have been reached in Berlin, Molotov’s conversations were on a frankly imperialist basis and that Molotov and Hitler in effect discussed the division of certain areas of the world. I do not believe that there will be any immediate developments or early positive moves on the part of the Soviet Union as the discussions were apparently only of a preliminary nature. I am of the opinion, however, that a greater rather than a lesser degree of Soviet-German collaboration must be anticipated in the immediate future. In regard to the Far East, the “price”, evidently embodying territorial concessions by Japan, which the Soviet Government will demand in return for an agreement is not clear. Such possibilities as the return of the southern half of Sakhalin and perhaps certain of the more northern of the Kurile Islands suggest themselves in addition to the demands the Soviets may present with respect to the mainland.