761.62/789: Telegram
The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:40 p.m.]
4670–4673. Kirk’s 3128, July 24, 11 a.m. The following considerations are outlined as of possible value as background in connection with Molotov’s arrival in Berlin today.
The German desire for a visit of Molotov to Berlin would probably find its explanation in one or both of two principal factors.
The first of these is the obsession of certain German circles—probably those around Von Ribbentrop—with the belief that if only a sufficiently imposing array of solidarity could be mustered between Germany and other powers in Europe and Asia, then the United States—impressed and disturbed—would become hesitant in its support of England and that the British [would become] disheartened to the point of considering a compromise peace.
It was an analogous line of reasoning which contributed to the establishment of the German-Russian understanding in the first instance, [Page 576] and it appears never to have lost its fascination for the makers of German policy.
The second factor is the increasing probability that the British position in the Near East will not be seriously threatened without direct German intervention and the natural German desire to have a reassuring understanding with a power which would command the flank of any large scale German military operation in that area.
There is little doubt, therefore, that the immediate impetus for the visit springs from the German side and that Russian consent to it—a consent which had been withheld for an entire year—represents an important Soviet concession to German wishes, even though it was not, as Berlin had hoped, given in time for the visit to take place before the American election. This concession would not be made unless the Russians had hopes of thereby achieving—or fears of otherwise not achieving—certain important objectives, and the fact of the visit may be taken as an indication that the Soviet Government, which has shown itself determined to lose no opportunity to profit by the preoccupation of others in order to improve its own future strategic position through territorial acquisition, now has its eyes on some further possibility along these lines.
But the border from the Baltic to the Black Sea may now be regarded as settled and for further acquisitions Russia would presumably have to look north of the Gulf of Finland or south of the Danube delta.
It should be borne in mind in this connection that in coming to Berlin, Molotov will be interested primarily in those territories or facilities which may be said to be at Germany’s effective disposal. It must be doubted whether Russian aims in eastern Turkey or in Iran49 would play any great part in inducing the Kremlin to send Molotov to Berlin. When the time comes and when there is some intimation of preoccupation of Turkey in other quarters, it must be assumed that Russia will take what she feels she advantageously can in that part of the world without asking leave of the Germans or paying tribute for the privilege. These more easterly territories may to be sure, be formally assigned to a Russian sphere of influence as a result of these discussions but they will not be the main point in question.
Russia’s most serious territorial aspirations connected with Molotov’s visit would therefore seem to boil down to Finland or the area around the Dardanelles. In Finland the Russians are going to encounter far greater inhibitions in German circles—particularly the Army—against further Russian penetration than was the case eight [Page 577] months ago. Through their conquest of northern Norway the Germans now have a stake in that part of the world which is important to them not only from considerations of military operations but also of military prestige. The advent of the Russians into northern Finland would not only render problematical the present supplying and reinforcing of these German troops over Finnish territory but would also confront these German forces in Norway for the first time with the proximity of a powerful and—in view of the strategic situation—potentially dangerous foreign land force.
This must not be taken to mean that there is no possibility that the Germans will toss the remainder of Finland to the Russian bear in order to facilitate their aims in the New [Near?] East. Ribbentrop, whose personal prestige is considerably involved with the German-Russian understanding, has on former occasions obtained Hitler’s consent to serious sacrifices in order to preserve this understanding and he may succeed in doing so again.
But the opposition to be overcome will be severe and if the German Army yields in Finland its demands will surely be stiffer with respect to the Near East.
Rumor has it that the Germans are prepared to concede to the Russians the entire Dardanelles area. If it be remembered that the Russians made this one of the prices of their cooperation with the Allied Powers in 1915 and were promised it in the event of a victorious conclusion of hostilities50 it would not be surprising if they should turn out to be asking for it again and the possibility of obtaining it would be one of the few conceivable explanations for the visit. Recent information [Page 578] here has not indicated any progress in Russian-Turkish relations which would preclude the pursuance of such aims on Russia’s part.
On the other hand if the Germans are planning to use this territory in the near future as a channel of expansion toward the Near East it would be difficult to conceive of any satisfactory arrangement which could be concluded just at this time. There can scarcely be any desire on the German side to conquer this area and then turn it over at once—or parts of it—to the Russians leaving the latter virtually sitting on the German line of march. Even an arrangement for a division of the area giving the German [s], say the Dardanelles and the Russians the Bosphorus would have this effect. And it is not likely that the Russians would be interested in any promises of future delivery which would involve an interim consented [consent?] to occupation.
An arrangement could more easily be envisaged if the Germans were prepared to keep their own hands off the area in question during the coming months. A passage of German armed forces through Bulgaria to Greece might well have the effect of producing hostilities between Turkey and Bulgaria. In this situation it might be left to the Russians to take what action they might wish against Turkey on the understanding that if they were to succeed in seizing the Dardanelles area Germany would impose no objection to their retaining it. In incurring some obligation of this nature which would amount initially to an agreement on spheres of influence the Germans might not be entirely impervious to the thought that the Russians might possibly become so seriously bogged down in eastern Turkey and Iran that an actual seizure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles during the coming winter would be improbable and that the German commitment might thus eventually in view of changed circumstances become meaningless. Such a plan would have the added advantage in the German view of keeping the Russians occupied with the Turks at a time when if idle they might be a constant source of worry on the German flank.
In return for any concessions of this nature which might be made in the Near East the Germans would probably demand first and foremost as indicated above a demonstrative association of the Soviet Union with the establishment of an anti-British “new order” in Europe and Asia or at least some gesture of acquiescence in this conception. They might also seek a deepening and widening of the present economic cooperation between the two countries designed not only to contribute to the propaganda effect of any political arrangements which may be made but also to render Germany less dependent during the coming months on the reserves and substance of the territories she has occupied or dominated in Europe. Any such development would presumably imply greater German efforts to meet the Russian need [Page 579] for up-to-date military equipment, a factor which may explain in part the inclusion of certain high officials of Soviet industry in the delegation.
It would be dangerous, however, to attribute the presence of so many high Russian officials solely to the need for the elaboration of the technical details of an increase in the exchange of goods between the two countries. The German expert Schnurre has been in Moscow a great deal recently and all such details could presumably be more conveniently worked out there at leisure. It is more likely that the size and composition of the delegation was conceived for its external effect. Ribbentrop took an imposing delegation to Moscow with him last year and it is possibly a dictate of the Russian Cossack prestige that Molotov should travel to Berlin with no less pomp and circumstance.
In conclusion it may be worth noting that whatever the more important decisions which may be finally sealed or arrived at through this visit it is not likely that they will find expression in the published result of the meeting. It is more probable that abstract intimations of Russian acquiescence in the German new order, mutual professions of recognition of the other party’s interest in certain undefined vital areas and professions of high intent with respect to the intensification of economic cooperation will all be put forward to mask the bolder details of the arrangements until such time as the latter can find their expression in the practical application of military and diplomatic policy.
Repeated to Moscow.
- For indications of pressure upon Iran by the Soviet Union, see vol. iii, pp. 621 ff.↩
- The Russian political aspirations for Constantinople and the Straits were formulated in a memorandum of February 19/March 4, 1915, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Dmitriyevich Sazonov. A translation in French is printed in Un livre noir: Diplomatic d’avant-guerre et de guerre d’après les documents des archives russes (1910–1917), (Paris, n. d.), vol. iii, août 1914–avril 1915, pp. 122–123. A summary is contained in Sazonov’s telegram of that date to the Ambassador in France, Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky, and to the Ambassador in Great Britain, Count Alexander Benckendorff, with English translation, printed in Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya v epokhu imperialisma: Dokumenty iz arkhirov tsarskogo i vremennogo pravitelstv 1878–1917 gg. [International Relations in the Epoch of Imperialism: Documents from the Archives of the Tsarist and Provisional Governments 1878–1917], (Moscow and Leningrad, 1935), series III, 1914–1917, vol. vii, part 1, No. 299, pp. 392–393. (There is a German translation, edited by Otto Hoetzsch, Die intemationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus: Dokumente aus den Archiven der Zarischen und der Provisorischen Regierung, series II, Vom Kriegsausbruch bis zum Herbst 1915 [Berlin, 1935], vol.vii, part 1, No. 299, p. 280.) The French acceptance of the Russian aspirations was conveyed on February 23/March 8, 1915, ibid., No. 330, pp. 424–425 (German translation, p. 301); and the British agreement came on February 27/March 12, 1915, ibid., No. 351, p. 452 (German translation, p. 318), accompanied by a memorandum of observations, ibid., No. 352, pp. 452–455 (German translation, pp. 318–320). See also E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, First Series, vol. iv, 1919, pp. 635–638; H. W. V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, vol. vi, pp. 4–9, and Foreign Relations, 1917, supp. 2, vol. i, pp. 493–507.↩