740.0011 European War 1939/6128: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7 p.m.]
1359. A member of the German Embassy who has just returned from Berlin with the German Ambassador, states in the strictest confidence that Ribbentrop will not come to Moscow at this time but that the Ambassador has received instructions from the German Government to endeavor to disquiet [allay?] the elements of friction which admittedly have arisen between the Soviet Union and Germany as the result of recent German moves in the Balkans and the conclusion of the military alliance with Japan. My informant stated that the instructions were general in nature and were designed primarily to ascertain the wishes of the Soviet Government at the present time as well as to convey the willingness of the German Government to discuss in friendly consultation such aspirations as the Soviet Government may now entertain or any problems relating to Soviet-German relations. He said the Tass denial reported in my No. 1355 of October 16 had been somewhat surprising and was not reassuring as he now understood that the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin37 had been informed by Ribbentrop prior to the entry of German troops into Rumania. It was possible, however, that the Soviet Government had confused the dispatch of German regular troops of which they were informed in advance with the departure of a military mission which had gone to Rumania somewhat earlier.
My informant stated that the German Ambassador would see Molotov today for the first exploratory conversation. This conversation would not deal with specific questions but should the Soviet attitude be favorable a variety of subjects might subsequently be discussed. What these subjects might be would depend on the Soviet reaction and the lengths to which the Soviet Government was prepared to go at the present time. He intimated, however, that the Ambassador would endeavor to ascertain the Soviet attitude toward the further development of Axis policy in the Balkans with particular reference to Turkey.
My informant said that while Germany would of course be pleased to have the Soviet Government adhere even indirectly to the German-Italian-Japanese [Page 569] alliance he very much doubted that the Soviet Government could be induced to take such a positive step which would definitely align the Soviet Union with the Axis Powers. On the other hand he said that some form of Soviet-Japanese agreement which Germany had always encouraged would probably be forthcoming in the near future; that although he could not forecast the exact details of any such agreement it might well take the form of a non-aggression pact,38 the cessation of Soviet aid to China with Soviet pressure on Chiang Kai-shek39 to conclude peace with Japan; the recognition by Japan of the Mongolian People’s Republic and possibly of a Soviet special interest in Tsinkiang.
My informant stated that he understood the departing Japanese Ambassador40 had held general discussions along the above lines with Molotov but that the negotiations were now in abeyance pending the arrival of the new Japanese Ambassador.41 The change of Japanese Ambassador at this time according to my informant was an error on the part of the Japanese Government as Togo had been persona grata with the Soviet Government.
My informant said that although the German Ambassador had been successful while in Berlin in bringing about the adoption of a conciliatory policy towards the Soviet Union at the present time, nevertheless there were influential groups in Germany whose anti-Soviet bias and whose conviction that sooner or later a Soviet-German war was inevitable were a complicating factor in the determination of German policy toward the Soviet Union. My informant frankly expressed concern as to the possible influence of these circles on Hitler. He said it was quite clear following his visit to Berlin that as a result of the apparent abandonment of an attempted invasion of England this autumn, German policy in Eastern Europe and in particular the German attitude toward Russia was more uncertain than at any time since the beginning of the war and that while for the moment the policy toward the Soviet Union was one of conciliation and not one of pressure or threats, the possibility of a sudden change in the German attitude could not be excluded. He added that in this regard the results of the Ambassador’s coming talk with Molotov would be very important.
- Alexander A. Shkvartsev.↩
- A neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan was signed at Moscow on April 13, 1941; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 29, 1945, p. 812.↩
- Generalissimo; President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Premier).↩
- Shigenori Togo.↩
- Lt. Gen. (retired) Yoshitsugu Tatekawa.↩