740.0011 European War 1939/6925: Telegram
The Minister in Rumania (Gunther) to the Secretary of State
Bucharest, November
27, 1940—6 p.m.
[Received November 28—6:50 a.m.]
[Received November 28—6:50 a.m.]
760. Yesterday afternoon Benton had a conversation with Cretzianu, Secretary General of the Foreign Office, the most important points of which are as follows:
- 1.
- Cretzianu said that the Foreign Office knows nothing definite with respect to the recent Hitler-Molotov talks. Asked if Rumania was not worried that Hitler and Molotov have perhaps made some sort of deal at the expense of Rumania, Cretzianu shrugged his shoulders and merely said that during the course of General Antonescu’s recent stay in Berlin, Hitler had reiterated that Germany guaranteed Rumania’s present frontiers and consequently the latter had nothing to worry about.
- 2.
- Cretzianu said that the fact that Bulgaria had not adhered to the Tripartite Pact—he had fully expected she would do so immediately [Page 531] after Rumania’s adherence46—puzzled and worried him. Bulgaria’s failure to adhere to the Pact he felt, might be due to one or the other of the following reasons: (a) Germany and Bulgaria were in complete agreement in respect to military and other policies in the Balkans, particularly as to an attack on Greece, and, therefore, did not desire to advertize too fully this agreement as would be the case if Bulgaria at this moment adhered to the Tripartite Pact until the necessary augmentation measures had been taken; (b) Bulgaria was closer to the U. S. S. R. than most people thought and Molotov had persuaded Bulgaria not to adhere to the Pact. Cretzianu seemed to feel that time alone would show which of these suppositions was correct. (I may say that the Bulgarian Minister47 has told me that his country is very anxious that Great Britain should recognize Rumania’s cession of territory in the Dobrudja; further that Bulgaria does not want to do anything which might jeopardize its value [valued?] relations with Great Britain.)
- 3.
- Cretzianu expressed the belief that sooner or later, probably sooner, Germany will have to send troops to Greece in order to straighten out the situation there. He said that Bulgaria was quietly but systematically mobilizing on the Greek frontier which gave weight to his first supposition (see preceding paragraph) that there was a close argument [agreement?] between Germany and Bulgaria in respect to an attack on Greece. Yugoslavia, he explained was very nervous, and reports received from Belgrade indicate that there was something in the air. Asked if he thought Yugoslavia would fight if Germany violated that country’s neutrality—endeavored to send troops through Yugoslavia en route to Greece—he replied that he did not think so. In this connection the Yugoslav Ambassador48 has remarked to me that he was certain his country would fight if its neutrality was violated by either Germany or Italy.
- 4.
- Cretzianu said that the Danubian Conference (please see my telegram No. 729, November 13, 8 p.m.49) had been broken off inasmuch as different delegates had had to return home for instructions. The Conference, however, would be resumed probably November 27, and he felt that the attitude of the participating powers, Russia in particular, would give some indication not only of what actually took place between Hitler and Molotov during their recent talks but of the course of future events in the Balkans.
- 5.
- During this conversation Cretzianu kept on reiterating that he “had the feeling” that the situation in the Balkans was coming to a [Page 532] head and that something—he did not know what—was likely to happen very soon.
Gunther