740.0011 European War 1939/6137: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:40 p.m.]
1360. The Turkish Ambassador who has just returned from Ankara and who had a lengthy conference with Molotov yesterday, has [Page 521] given me in the strictest confidence the following summary of his talk with Molotov.
In reply to an inquiry from the Ambassador as to the Soviet Government’s reaction to the German-Italian-Japanese alliance,31 Molotov observed that if the pact had been made 3 months ago on the heels of the crushing German victories its unquestioned design to bring about the apportionment of Europe and Asia between its members might have had a real meaning. However as a result of the developments of the past 3 months the pact was merely “so many words” as any apportionment of Europe or Asia would “rest with the victors”. The Ambassador gained the distinct impression from the remarks made by Molotov and his choice of language that he was by no means prepared to concede ultimate victory to the members of the tripartite alliance and that he regarded the United States as being already an ally of Britain.
In response to an inquiry from the Ambassador as to the Soviet Government’s reaction to the developments in Rumania and to a specific question whether the Soviet Government had been advised of the German intentions Molotov replied that his Government had been neither consulted nor advised and that “the Soviet Government would ask for explanations at the proper time.”
Molotov then asked the Ambassador whether he could outline for him Turkish intentions in the event of further penetration by the Axis Powers in the Balkans. The Ambassador replied that the Turkish Government was finally resolved to carry out all of its obligations under existing agreements and that although Turkey was under no obligation to defend Greece, in the event of an Italian attack the Turkish Government had decided that an invasion of Greece by Italy, particularly in respect of Thrace, could not be regarded as having only local significance but would have to be construed as the forerunner of a violation of Turkish territory, in consequence of which the Turkish Government had decided to assist Greece with all the military power at its command in case Italy made such an attack. The Ambassador also told Molotov that Turkey would resist with arms any attempt by the Axis Powers to invade Syria.
Insofar as concerned Bulgaria, the Ambassador advised Molotov that his Government regarded that country as completely under Axis domination and believed that recent Bulgarian military preparations could only in the final analysis be directed against Turkey in consequence of which the Turkish Government had taken measures to meet [Page 522] any attack from that source whether launched by Bulgaria or with Bulgaria as a [place d’armes?] for Axis troops.
The Ambassador told me that 3 months ago Molotov had requested him to caution his Government against involvement in the Balkans but that at their conference yesterday his attitude was noticeably changed inasmuch as he had expressed no disapproval of Turkish intentions as outlined to him by the Ambassador but on the contrary specifically agreed with him in his presentation of the Turkish treatment of the situation in Bulgaria.
In response to my inquiry the Ambassador stated that he had neither asked for nor received any assurances from Molotov as to the position of the Soviet Union in respect of any of the foregoing eventualities but that he had gained the impression that should hostilities develop out of one or more of the contingencies outlined above Turkey might count upon the real if not the benevolent neutrality of the Soviet Union.
The Ambassador also told me that the Turkish Government had a force of over 1,000,000 men concentrated for the defense of the Straits against any attack that might be launched either from Greek or Bulgarian bases and that it was the opinion of his Government that the Italians could not cross the Straits with an army of less than 1,000,000 men. He referred to Gallipoli as an example of the difficulty of invading Turkey with the Straits on one side and the British Eastern Mediterranean Fleet presumably protecting the Turkish western flank.32 From the general tenor of the information given me by the Ambassador I gained the impression that he had presented the Turkish position to Molotov without the slightest equivocation and that he felt his statement of that position was not displeasing to the Soviet Government.
- Three power pact of assistance signed at Berlin on September 27, 1940; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 386. For correspondence regarding negotiation of this treaty, see pp. 633 ff.↩
- The reference here is to the naval and land attacks in the unsuccessful Gallipoli campaign during the First World War between February 19, 1915, and January 9, 1916.↩