740.0011 European War 1939/2115

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

The Norwegian Minister came in today, unexpectedly. He was obviously worried.

He referred to his telephone inquiry of yesterday and said he hoped that we might be able to make some representations in support of Norwegian neutrality. He thought perhaps we could do it on the often expressed American statement that the war should not be allowed to spread.

Although, he said, it was unbelievable that Britain should lower her moral level and violate the Norwegian neutrality, the situation was, in his view, menacing. In response to my question, he thought matters might move very rapidly. He knew that the German government concentrated troops at Stettin; he thought that if the British went forward with their plan the result would be to make southern Scandinavia a battleground and “wipe out northern civilization, which we have worked for so hard and for so many years.”

I could give him very little encouragement, save to say that we would continue to study it with all sympathy; but that there were obvious difficulties in the way of asserting neutral rights, which in practice might easily have actual importance in war operations. The Minister agreed that this was so; but he pointed out that neutral rights always had this effect, to some extent.

He then told me, in confidence, that the day before yesterday the Russian Ambassador, whom he had not seen for months, called upon him. The purpose of Oumansky’s call was to inform the Norwegian Minister—obviously with intent that it should be reported—that Russia considered the Finnish adventure liquidated;7 that she had absolutely no further demands on Finland; that the talk of her desiring ice-free ports and the like was merely anti-Soviet propaganda; that Russia’s only desire was to be a good neighbor to Scandinavia and that they might be at rest so far as Russian designs were concerned.

I said I was glad to hear this. Confidentially, we had received reports at an earlier stage of the Finnish matter indicating that wider designs might be under consideration. I was glad, I said, to learn of the present Russian assurance.

The Minister then reported that although his government had been negotiating in London for free passage of the Norwegian Line boats [Page 140] carrying American mail, they had got nowhere, and no further purpose would be served by continuing the discussions. Accordingly, we were back where we started. He hoped that we would not be hard on the Norwegian Line, which thus found itself, through no fault of its own, in an extremely difficult position, since its boats would be carried into a British control station if they did carry mail—which they were proposing to avoid.

I told the Minister, confidentially, that I understood the British were proposing to establish a control station in Nova Scotia; and that if the matter could be kept open for a short time it was reasonably probable that the question would solve itself.

The Minister, in leaving, emphasized the need for speed if anything were to be done in connection with the matter of Norwegian neutrality. He stressed his feeling that the very life of Scandinavia might be at stake.

A. A. Berle, Jr.
  1. For correspondence regarding the Soviet-Finnish war, see pp. 269 ff.