760D.61/1288: Telegram
The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
Berlin, March 11,
1940—6 p.m.
[Received 9:33 p.m.]
[Received 9:33 p.m.]
621. My 468, February 21, 10 a.m., and 590, March 8, 8 p.m.,99 Svinhufvud, former President of Finland, has been staying at the Finnish Legation here since his arrival in Berlin 3 days ago and although he failed in his effort to see the Chancellor, has conversed with other German officials. He is now leaving for Rome and has communicated to me through the Finnish Minister the following impressions derived from his discussions in Berlin:
- 1.
- Objections are not being raised by Germany to the departure for Finland of increased numbers of volunteers from Sweden and it is possible that a similar accommodating attitude on the part of the German Government towards the transit through Sweden of British and French volunteers in limited number might be expected. Furthermore no objections are being raised by Germany to the shipment to Finland via Sweden of additional Allied war material including airplanes.
- 2.
- Sweden need not have feared a German attack even if it had participated openly in the war and Germans disclaim having threatened Sweden in this respect.
- 3.
- Germany might reluctantly admit action by the British and the French at Petsamo and Murmansk as such steps might result in a rupture of relations between the Soviets and the Allies and furthermore the German Government would not be inclined to risk the unpopularity of a war against Finland on the sole basis of an Anglo-French attack on Murmansk.
- 4.
- Allied help to Finland which would involve the establishment of England and France in the northern part of Scandinavia or the use of Norwegian ports to land Allied troops would certainly meet with German opposition which might take the form of air attacks on Finland or an ultimatum to Sweden.
- 5.
- Although the Soviet-Finnish conflict and its possible consequences are sufficiently disturbing to the Germans to warrant a possible willingness to facilitate a peace, the highest authorities in Germany with a view to Soviet-German relations profess indifference as to the future fate of Finland. This apparent indifference might change, however, in the event that Finland might maintain its stand and that through overcautious aid to Finland a conflict in Scandinavia might be precipitated. Germany, it is said, owing to its dependence [Page 311] upon Russia for supplies is not in a position to alter Russian demands on Finland, but there seems to be an understanding of the important argument that if Finland on the basis of the concessions demanded should now make peace with the Soviets without adequate guarantees the latter would later reopen the conflict with Finland and accordingly there is some indication that a form of guarantee by Germany of Finnish integrity following a peace might be forthcoming.
Repeated to Moscow.1
Kirk