760D.61/1217: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 6—11:18 p.m.]
248. Personal for the Secretary only. My 219, February 28, 6 p.m., and Department’s 145, March 5, 7 p.m.70 Since my talk with Molotov at his luncheon February 28th the Swedish Minister has had a conversation with him concerning the possibility of bringing the hostilities in Finland to an end. Last night the Swedish Minister had a further talk with Molotov, in the course of which the latter referred to his talks with me and intimated that the Soviet Government would not be averse to an armistice should the Finnish Government desire to send one or more emissaries to Moscow. Although Molotov was not specific in setting forth Soviet peace terms the Minister gained the impression that the Soviets would require a line slightly northwest of Viborg thence around Lake Ladoga to include the territory northeast of that lake which the Soviet armed forces have thus far been unable to occupy, Smnalso71 Hango and the islands in the Gulf of Finland but that out of consideration for Norwegian and Swedish sensibilities the Soviet Government might not press its claim to any part of the Rybachii Peninsula72 or Petsamo. He also gained the impression that the Soviets would not cede any territory to Finland in return for the foregoing concessions on the grounds that they would not make the same concessions to an independent Finnish government that they were prepared to make to the Kuusinen government. Insofar as concerns the Åland Islands the Minister said that Molotov had intimated that the Soviet Union would not be averse to these islands remaining in status quo or even these being transferred to Sweden.
He said that at no time during the conversation was Kuusinen’s name mentioned and that therefore he was by no means certain but that once negotiations began an attempt might be made by the Soviets to insist upon a Kuusinen government or the inclusion of Kuusinen in the Finnish Government and that he was convinced the Finns would not agree to any such condition.
He stated that Molotov had clearly implied that at the present stage the Soviet Government does not desire any intermediary or mediation by a third power.
[Page 298]The Minister stated that in his opinion it would be necessary for Tanner and perhaps Mannerheim to leave Finland at least temporarily if the negotiations are to succeed.
The Minister concluded that the apparent willingness of the Soviet Government to consider peace at the present time has been induced in part by the unfavorable reaction in the United States to the attack on Finland and particularly the President’s last speech.73
As a result of his talk with Molotov last night the Minister believes that the Soviet Government is now feeling its way carefully with a desire to bring the Finnish conflict to an end on such terms as will fully safeguard Soviet prestige, but he does not think that the Soviet Government has yet entirely determined on its course of action.
While it is impossible at this time to evaluate with any degree of accuracy the sincerity of the Soviet willingness to negotiate a settlement with an independent Finnish Government, the opening of informal discussions is in itself of considerable significance. The obvious explanation is that the Soviet Government having doubts as to the possibility of obtaining a final military decision over Finland beyond the advent of the thaw which will render military operations virtually impossible for a period of from 1 to 2 months, necessitating the maintenance of a force believed to be approximately 1,000,000 men under arms on the Finnish front with the consequent drain on Soviet internal economy, complicated by the possibility of serious developments in the Black Sea area,74 is interested in ascertaining the exact terms which the Finnish Government would be prepared to accept at the present time.
- Latter not printed.↩
- Apparently garbled; perhaps Sortavala was intended.↩
- Fisherman’s Peninsula; Kalastajasaarento.↩
- Speech by President Roosevelt to the American Youth Congress at Washington on February 10, 1940, wherein he remarked that American sympathy was about 98 percent with the Finns; for text, see Samuel I. Rosenman (compiler), The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. ix, pp. 85, 92.↩
- For correspondence concerning Soviet activities in the Balkans and the seizure of Bessarabia, see pp. 444 ff.↩