740.0011 European War 1939/34877/10: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 13—10:29 p.m.]
1643. Personal for the President and the Secretary. I have just read minutes of today’s meeting at Tours. Reynaud told Churchill that Weygand was insisting on an armistice; the French Army could not fight any longer—there was nothing but death and destruction ahead for all of France; German propaganda was seeping through the Army as well as the populace; it was only matter of hours but that the Army would refuse to fight. Therefore Reynaud at insistence of his Ministers must ask England to release France from her agreement not to sign separate peace; after all it had been France that had suffered, it was her soldiers who had died, and without any recrimination on either side Reynaud expected England to agree to peace for France. Churchill answered that, of course, no matter what happened there would be no recrimination.
It was unfortunate that France had suffered such losses, but England’s moment for her losses was arriving, yet it was England’s intention to stand firm and not to surrender, that Hitler could never be victorious [Page 249] unless England were defeated, that France under any kind of an agreement with Germany would be a thing of the past and no matter what her temporary losses were she meant to fight to make France live. England would carry on from the new world with her fleet and France could do likewise, because with both fleets against her Germany could never live. After these two statements it seems to me that for the record it really got down to Reynaud saying that unless the United States declared war on Germany and came in France was not going to fight.
Reynaud wanted to send another message to President Roosevelt saying that the hour had arrived, that France must make peace unless the United States came in with all sorts of help short of sending an expeditionary force, if they would not declare war on Germany. Churchill urged Reynaud not to come to a decision until President Roosevelt’s answer to Reynaud’s request had come in. He went on to point out that if Reynaud made peace regardless of England’s interest the day might come when the people of France would be starved because the British fleet might well be the means of stopping food from coming to them.
From reading the minutes I could not help but feel that barring an absolute declaration of war by the United States the French were about to give up and that Churchill was making desperate effort to have France continue guerrilla warfare and with their fleet carry on the Government somewhere else.
The arrival of your note to Reynaud which I handed to Churchill immediately on his return from Paris gave British Cabinet great courage and Churchill feels that it is sufficiently strong to warrant the French fighting on.
Whether that is so or not time alone will tell but from a cold observation as I read it I think it will take more than that. I called you (on phone) at Churchill’s insistence to ask you if your note2 could be published because Churchill said that morale in France must be bucked up in order to keep them in the fight and he thinks your note will do it.
The danger of publication of your note to Reynaud as I see it is that Churchill sees in your note an absolute commitment of the United States to the Allies that if France fights on the United States will be in the war to help them if things go bad at some later date. Frankly as I read the message that is what I see in it. I realize the tragedy of the present moment and how important it is for the success of these poor people that their morale should be bucked up; nevertheless I see a great danger in the message as a commitment at a later date.