740.0011 European War 1930/3500½: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

1022. Personal for the President. Marshal Pétain91 lunched with me alone today. After luncheon, talking in the garden, he said that he wondered if the French Government had ever given you a completely frank view of the present situation. I replied that I feel that both Reynaud and Daladier talked with me with entire frankness. He went on to say that nevertheless he would like to let you know how he personally viewed the situation.

The threefold superiority of the Germans in man power was accompanied by a much greater superiority in aeroplanes and in tanks.

The airplane had proved to be the decisive weapon in this war. France was hopelessly outnumbered in the air.

Against the German attack which would be made before the end of this week on the Somme and in the region of Laon and the region of Reims the French had nothing to oppose but their courage. In all forms of material they were now desperately outclassed.

He did not wish me to conceal from you the fact that he himself envisaged very definitely the possibility that the Germans would be able to cross the Somme and the lower Seine and envelop Paris. Every inch added to the length of the French line would make the German superiority in numbers more effective.

As if the odds were not already enough two new elements had now entered into his calculations.

(1)
It was certain that Italy would enter the war. There were no planes to combat the Italian planes and the destruction which the [Page 239] Italian planes might inflict on the southern portions of France would be terrible. Moreover the Italians might land troops from parachutes and take the entire French Alps region from the rear.
(2)
Even more serious was the behavior of the British during the last few days. So long as the British Army had been in Flanders the British had engaged their Air Force fully. But they had insisted that their Army should be taken off first and that the French divisions should hold the lines fighting against the Germans while the British were embarked. Since all the British had been embarked the British had ceased to send their planes in anything like the numbers they had employed so long as the British Expeditionary Force was at Dunkirk.

Furthermore, at this moment when the French had almost no reserves and were facing the greatest attack in human history the British were pretending that they could send no reserves from England. There was actually now one British division in France and the British were asserting that they could send no more.

Moreover they had refused to send over the British aviation, which alone could combat the German Air Force, to support the French Army. Moreover, they had refused to agree to unified command in the Mediterranean when it was obvious that only a unified command and a joint attack of the British and French forces in the Mediterranean the moment Mussolini should declare war could give hope of eliminating Italy from the conflict.

Under the circumstances he was obliged to feel that the British intended to permit the French to fight without help until the last available drop of French blood should have been shed and that then with quantities of troops on British soil and plenty of planes and a dominant fleet the British after a very brief resistance or even without resistance would make a peace of compromise with Hitler, which might even involve a British Government under a British Fascist leader.

The Marshal added that he intended to make statements in line with the above at the meeting of the War Council tomorrow. He felt that unless the British Government should send to France, to engage in the battle which was imminent, both its air force and reserve divisions the French Government would do its utmost to come to terms immediately with Germany whatever might happen to England. He added that it was not fair for any French Government to permit the British to behave in a totally callous and selfish manner while demanding the sacrifice of every able-bodied Frenchman.

Bullitt
  1. Henri Philippe Pétain, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers.