740.0011 European War 1939/3051: Telegram
The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:20 p.m.]
1332. Judging from the outward manifestations as noted in Berlin the entry of the war upon its critical phase caused little general surprise and in view of the public optimism which the German successes in Norway had created the depressing effects of a shock have been in large part avoided. Thus prepared the public seems to have already settled down to a state of anxious expectancy which however is most notably controlled as regards any outward demonstrations.
The moral stigma on the reputation of Germany caused by her invasion of Holland and Belgium is realized by the more intelligent sections of the population but with the persistent and effective propaganda and reports of continual successes to date even these circles have largely come to the point of view that German dominance is an historical necessity overriding the rights and sufferings of smaller states in its path. Even when the latter considerations are accorded a certain validity they are subordinated to the belief that the war has now irrevocably begun and must be fought out to the bitterest end utilizing any and all means and facing the most far-reaching sacrifices. The uncritical majority seem to have been fairly well convinced by propaganda that Belgium and Holland were secretly assisting the Allies in the prosecution of the war and therefore deserve their fate but many of the older people who experienced the effects of the last war entertain feelings of scepticism and hopeless dread of what the future may hold. A possibly larger part of the young people, however, who have been indoctrinated by the influences of National Socialism appear to accept Germany’s war venture as a gamble which it has more than an [Page 200] even chance of winning, particularly in the light of what they regard as Allied failures and evidences of weakness.
Although it is realized in this group that strategical considerations will determine the course of the German campaign it is felt that as the deserving victim, Great Britain will be made to bear the largest share of German retribution. The limits to which this idea of retribution is envisaged as extending varies in different groups of thought and includes not only the extremistcism [extremism?] to annihilate the British Empire but also a more moderate purpose of gaining force by a tactical position of advantage from which a peace proposal may be regarded as possible of a successful launching.
At all events the belief is gaining ground that Germany’s fate will depend upon its ability to forestall the vengeance that may be wrought upon it by defeat and that this issue can now only be decided by force of arms. Thus to this extent Hitler seems to have placed the public in a position which compels their allegiance and while there are few demonstrations of enthusiasm the German people seem to be going about their appointed tasks with accustomed obedience and a halfhearted patriotic determination.