Office of the Historian

711.942/387: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, December 18, 1939—midnight.
[Received December 18—8:45 p.m.]

689. Please permit me very respectfully to express to you the following views with reference to my several telegrams to be despatched this evening which present a problem of critical importance in American-Japanese relations. Obviously I am looking at the problem from the angle of this Embassy on the basis of our own observations and analyses and must defer to the wider and fuller outlook of the Government in Washington.

1.
The simple fact is that we are here dealing not with a unified Japan but with a Japanese Government which is endeavoring courageously, even with only gradual success, to fight against a recalcitrant Japanese Army, a battle which happens to be our own battle. The Government needs support in that fight. If we now rebuff the Government we shall not be serving to discredit the Japanese Army but rather to furnish the army with powerful arguments to be used in its own support.
2.
Obviously we cannot count upon implementation of today’s assurance that “it is the intention to open the Yangtze in about 2 months” until that step has actually been taken. Nevertheless, if we now meet the initiative of the Japanese Government by an uncompromising refusal to consider either a modus vivendi or an approach to negotiations for a new treaty until the opening of the Yangtze and perhaps other steps have been actually accomplished, we shall be administering a rebuff which may well bring about the fall of the present Cabinet.
3.
On the other hand, if we meet the Japanese Government’s initiative by offering a modus vivendi and an approach to negotiations for a new treaty with such reasonable conditions as may commend themselves to our Government we shall be furnishing the Japanese Government with equally powerful support in the eyes of the Japanese public. Ratification of an eventual treaty could be made dependent upon implementation of assurances.
4.
Whatever reply I am to be instructed to return to the Foreign Minister in answer to his initiative I earnestly recommend that it not close the door and that it be of such a character as to encourage the Minister in continuing his patent efforts to meet our position. Such a reply will be far more likely to bring in its train further Japanese steps towards ameliorating the situation of our interests in China than would result from a rebuff. I am convinced that at this juncture we are in a position either to direct American-Japanese relations into a progressively healthy channel or to accelerate their movement straight down hill.
Grew