711.94/1349: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 21—1:08 p.m.]
616. 1. A highly placed Japanese has called on me twice within the past few days immediately after seeing the Prime Minister and in anticipation of a further interview with Prime Minister shortly. He said that the Prime Minister is profoundly anxious to improve [Page 598] Japanese-American relations but that “he does not know what to do”. He would like to open the Yangtze to American navigation and trade but such a step had been found to be strategically and practically difficult at the present time. My informant asked what other step or steps could be taken which would help to change the anti-Japanese atmosphere in the United States. He added that many influential Japanese, some of whom he named, were equally anxious to conciliate the United States and were actively studying the question, but that they also “did not know what to do”.
2. My informant then informally approached what was on their part the main purpose of his two visits. He said it was felt by his friends, presumably including the Prime Minister, that our Government should meet Japan half-way by taking steps which would strengthen the hand of the Japanese Government and facilitate its efforts towards improving relations with the United States. These friends were seriously worried at the prospect of a possible treatyless situation between the two countries. What could be done to open negotiations for a new treaty?
3. In reply I said that this question had not been broached to me officially and that if it should be broached I could only take it under reference. I mentioned the Secretary’s announcement at the time of the denunciation.13 I then talked at length in regard to questions underlying American-Japanese relations along the lines of my speech of October 19 and my interview with the Foreign Minister on November 4, adding my comment to the following effect: The settlement of a few individual issues and incidents while gratifying will in itself by no means serve to place American-Japanese relations on a firm footing especially as new issues and incidents in derogation of American legitimate rights and interests in China are arising almost daily. Several of these new issues and incidents I mentioned specifically by way of illustration. I said that the opening of the Yangtze, while important, would meet only one issue among many issues. Certain fundamental differences in our respective points of view would have to be solved before our relations could be placed on a firm basis. In the meantime the American Government and people would expect something more than pious assurances of intention with regard to Japanese support of the principle of equal opportunity in China, in other words they would desire concrete evidence of progressive abatement in the present system of a closed economy in large areas in China working exclusively in Japanese interests. I furthermore suggested that the Prime Minister might wish to call for the documents left with the Foreign Minister on November 4 and to study them.
[Page 599]4. While I have had many recent similar talks, the foregoing conversations are reported at this considerable length because I have no doubt that my visitor was exploring the situation informally but directly on behalf of the Prime Minister himself.