893.102 Tientsin/403
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
The French Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request.
The Ambassador read to me a telegram dated July 18 which had [Page 541] been sent by the French Ambassador at Tokyo22 reporting on the course of the British negotiations.23 The French Ambassador in Tokyo had expressed the belief that while both the Japanese and the British Governments were in accord in desiring a satisfactory agreement as a result of the negotiations, nevertheless, the deliberate inflammation of public opinion by the extremist elements and the growing influence of the extremist military authorities in Japan made it highly unlikely that any agreement could be found. The telegram went on to say that the German Embassy in Tokyo and German agents were now cooperating notoriously with the extremist military authorities in Japan and that much German money was being spent. The French Ambassador in Tokyo stated that he was convinced that the “Hochi”, which had recently adopted a violently reactionary and pro-German policy, had been bought by the German Embassy and was now completely under German control.
I gave the Ambassador the gist of the telegram dated July 20 received from the American Embassy in Tokyo with regard to the negotiations.23a
The Ambassador then went on to say that while he was not authorized to do so, and far less had instructions to do so, he desired to read to me a note sent by the French Foreign Office under date of June 15 to the British Embassy in Paris written in reply to an inquiry received by the French Government from the British Government as to the attitude which France would take in the event that Great Britain requested her to join in the adoption of measures of reprisal and retaliation against Japan. The Ambassador said it was impossible for him to let me have a copy of this communication.
The contents of the note were as follows: France declares that in the event that measures of retaliation and reprisal are undertaken, France will definitely not get out in front and appear to take the initiative in the matter; that on the other hand, if several governments adopt a common policy in this regard so that the risks of Japanese retaliation are spread, France will be willing to take part in such policy. She declares that cooperation in this matter of France, Great Britain, and the United States is essential, and that the cooperation of the United States in the event that such a policy is adopted is imperative because of the vulnerability of French Indochina to Japanese attack. France states that if measures of reprisal, such as an embargo upon Japanese exports and upon the import into Japan of raw materials and other commodities from other powers, are to be [Page 542] placed in effect, France would require not only that such measures be undertaken by common accord among the governments primarily interested in China, in any event between France, Great Britain, and the United States, but would likewise require guarantees of assistance in the event that such a policy should result in an attack by Japan upon French colonial possessions. France states on the other hand that if the measures are to be limited to the furthering of financial and commercial assistance to China, some indication to Japan that the measures undertaken by the governments concerned are simultaneous or parallel and taken as the result of a common understanding would be sufficient.
The French Government points out that the most effective means of rendering assistance to China at the present time is through the furnishing of arms and ammunition. It is emphasized that only three routes for the shipment of such supplies to China are now open, namely, the route through Turkestan which is long and results in great expense, the route over the new road from Burma which has just been opened and which is expensive and is as yet insecure, and finally, transshipment through French Indochina. If transshipments through French Indochina are to be undertaken, France insists that such opening of French Indochina to transshipment must be recognized by Japan as the result of an agreement in this regard on the part of the several powers most concerned in order that Japan will clearly recognize that such a policy on the part of France is undertaken only with the assurance of support from Great Britain and the United States. It is emphasized repeatedly in the note that France will not agree to any measure of this character nor to any measure of retaliation or reprisal against Japan without assurances from the United States. The French Government states that this is a sine qua non. The note goes on to say that if a general accord on the part of the nations most interested in China can be found, the Government of Australia should be included as well as the Government of the Netherlands, although it is recognized that the latter would be reluctant to take part in any such concerted action without effective guarantees of the most positive character, and that the form of such guarantees must depend in the last analysis upon the United States.
I expressed to the Ambassador my appreciation of his courtesy in giving me in this succinct and clear form the views of the French Government with regard to this question. I said that I should like to give these questions very full consideration before giving him any reaction of any kind. I said, however, that in the consideration of these questions I would desire to have very clearly from him his interpretation of one feature of the note which he had read to me. I asked him if I was correct in understanding that the note implied that the French Government would not undertake any measures of retaliation [Page 543] against Japan in the nature of commercial or financial embargoes unless such measures formed a part of a common agreement between several powers to which the United States must necessarily be a party and further, unless the Government of the United States were willing to give guarantees to France that it would take part in the defense of French Far Eastern colonial possessions should the latter be attacked by Japan as a result of the measures taken.
The Ambassador stated that my understanding was entirely correct.
I said that, of course, the Ambassador must fully recognize that such an agreement on the part of the United States would be tantamount to entering into a defensive alliance of a military and naval character with France and that no such alliance could be concluded without the ratification of the United States Senate. I also reminded him that this Government had made it plain from the outset of the hostilities in China that this Government was taking and would take an independent course, depending upon the fundamental interests of the United States and as they might be affected by the course of events and that while for obvious reasons we had frequently taken action parallel to that of France and of Great Britain during the past three years, nevertheless such action had been taken because in our judgment circumstances at the moment warranted it and our action at no time had been the result of prior agreements or commitments entered into. The Ambassador said he fully recognized that this was the case.
I told the Ambassador that I would have an opportunity of speaking with him again next week with regard to some of the aspects of the note which he had brought to my attention.
- Charles Arsène-Henry.↩
- See section entitled, “American Interest in Situation Created by Japanese Demands on the British Concession at Tientsin,” vol. iv, pp. 163 ff.↩
- Ibid., p. 223.↩