894.50/110
The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 3.]
Sir: In reference to our telegram 53, January 31, 1939, 3 p.m., and despatch 3679, February 14, 1939,87 both on the subject of possible economic retaliation against Japan, particularly as favored by the British Embassy at Tokyo, I have the honor to enclose herewith copy of paraphrase,88 as supplied to me, of telegram from the British Ambassador January 27, 1939, to the British Foreign Office (which was substantially embodied in our telegram 53), and to submit the following brief comments on points touched upon in the telegram and not treated in the despatch.
In conversations last year between Sir Robert Craigie and myself, and between members of our respective staffs, we noticed that there was reflected in the observations of our British colleagues an assumption that there is a quantitative and qualitative identity of American and British interests and that, therefore, if “corrective measures” were instituted to conserve British interests, similar measures on the part of the United States would, as a matter of course, be instituted by the United States. I made it clear to Sir Robert that our respective countries were on common ground in insisting, in the Far East as elsewhere, on the observance of certain fundamental rules in the conduct of international relations, that both nations are party to a treaty which was intended to safeguard their rights and interests in China89 and are, [Page 520] therefore, equally concerned over the assaults being made on the integrity of that treaty, and that there are certain specific questions, such as freedom of navigation on the Yangtze River and trade restrictions in north China, in which our two nations have a common concern. I could not, however, agree that our respective interests, both political and economic, in the Far East are relatively of equal importance. I pointed out that British policy envisaged the permanent retention of territorial possessions in the Far East, whereas it is the policy of the United States to grant independence to the Philippine Islands on a date fixed in the not distant future, that the returns on British investments and enterprises in China form an important item to set off against Great Britain’s large adverse trade balance, whereas returns from American investments and enterprises in China are comparatively small and are not needed to balance American foreign trade, which usually shows an export surplus; and that, if the question of using corrective measures were to be considered chiefly on the ground of expediency, I could not recommend to my Government an affirmative decision.
Sir Robert has now moved over to the new and more comprehensive argument of the maintenance of the sanctity of treaties and other principles of orderly international relations. He acknowledges an element of risk in a policy of sanctions but holds that risk of war is slight if the matter is “properly handled”; that such risk as there is arises from possible irresponsible action by younger officers and reactionary elements, and then only if the matter is mishandled (as by ill-timed publicity). He indicates “that the anticipation by Japan of increasing pressure upon her would cause her to moderate her policy long before pressure reached its maximum effect.”
I submit that the issue is far too huge to warrant risking its success on the vagaries of irresponsible younger officers or reactionary Japanese (of which a supply is always on hand), or on the silence of newspaper men.
In connection with the clause above-quoted from Sir Robert’s telegram to the British Foreign Office, we have pointed out to the British Embassy that if sanctions were to be imposed for the purpose of preserving the sanctity of the Nine-Power Treaty, it did not seem to us that the purpose of such measure would have been accomplished by “moderation” by Japan of her policy to the extent of, say, removing restrictions on third-party trade with China.
The British Embassy, in urging pressure against Japan to force abandonment of the program in China, advises that the way be left open for a face-saving cover to Japanese submission. In our opinion this advice reflects a grave misconception of the part which the China hostilities occupy in the mind of the Japanese nation. The nation is engaged in the greatest collective effort of its history, the cost already [Page 521] has been terrific, and although quick complete victory has not been attained the people still expect success. A settlement bringing only nominal gains would be unacceptable and impossible of imposition upon the public by misrepresentation. A return to anything approaching the status which existed before the hostilities is unthinkable except as the consequence of national exhaustion, and the state of the nation is still far short of the degree of exhaustion without which acceptance of frustration is inconceivable.
My British colleague interprets Japanese policy as based on an assumption that the United States and Great Britain will not take joint action. That there is a clear difference between the Japanese attitude toward Great Britain and the Japanese attitude toward the United States seems to us undebatable; but we do not find its explanation primarily in a desire on the part of Japan to keep the United States and Great Britain apart. In our opinion a recognition that involvement in the Far East is fundamentally different as between the United States and Great Britain is the basic explanation. When the Japanese assert that foreign rights and interests in China will be respected but political machinations not tolerated, their thought is not in all respects clear; but it is clear enough to make it evident that difficulties must arise not so much with the United States as with the British Empire, the Asiatic ties of which patently involve political entanglements. With China itself the interests of the British Empire have led Great Britain in the past to assume an attitude involving far deeper political implications than have been comprised in American policy in China. Japan, of course, has noted the contrast. As toward Great Britain she apprehends that a frontal conflict of interest may be unavoidable; as toward the United States she hopes that a policy of solving differences one by one as they arise will be adequate to the maintenance of tolerable relations.
Respectfully yours,
- Latter not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 276.↩