793.94/14667½
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
There are attached below four memoranda volunteered by officers of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs on various aspects of the situation [Page 508] in the Far East and problems of American policy and action in relation thereto, as follows:
Memorandum by:
- Mr. Vincent, July 23, 1938;74
- Mr. Sturgeon, December 1, 1938;75
- Mr. Adams, January 27, 1939;75
- Mr. Salisbury, January 30, 1939.75a
Of these officers, Mr. Adams and Mr. Vincent are “China” officers; Mr. Salisbury and Mr. Sturgeon are “Japan” officers.
Mr. Adams and Mr. Vincent take positions to the effect that the United States could and should follow a positive course in regard to the Far Eastern situation. Mr. Salisbury takes a position that we should at some time act but the present is not the opportune moment. Mr. Sturgeon takes a position that we are not in position to act.
Mr. Vincent, writing seven months ago, expressed views, among others, as follows: “I believe …76 that it is vitally important not only for China but for us and for other democratic nations that Chinese resistance not collapse.… I cannot but earnestly recommend that, within the limitations of our desire to avoid involvement.… we should overlook no opportunity now to bolster up Chinese will and ability to resist, and to embarrass the Japanese in their attempts to conquer China. To those ends I believe (a) that the doctrine of non-recognition should be unequivocally restated to apply in the present situation, (b) that as a corollary to non-recognition steps should be taken effectively to discourage loans or material credits to Japan or to Chinese regimes or agencies under Japanese control, (c) that the possibility of affording financial assistance to China should be thoroughly explored, (d) that our trade with Japan should be carefully examined with a view to withholding, either through export or import restrictions or both, assistance to Japan, and (e) that consultation and collaboration, if possible, with other interested governments in regard to the implementation of feasible measures should be undertaken.
“I realize that some of these matters can only appropriately be dealt with legislatively rather than administratively, but in so far as action may be taken administratively I feel that it should be taken, and where legislative action is required I think that the influence of the Department should be brought to bear.”
Mr. Sturgeon, writing two months ago, took the position “that retaliatory action on our part, if taken at all, should be strictly limited to such measures as would afford the least possible opportunity for the Japanese military authorities in China to make issues of them.” He favored watchful waiting. He brought his memorandum to a close [Page 509] with the statement, “It is believed that our moves in this situation should be made in such manner as (a) to leave the way, as well as the atmosphere, clear for the settlement of some of the questions at issue by the conference method and (b) to leave the way open for revision or adjustment of our Far Eastern policy to conditions which probably can only be correctly appraised after the Sino-Japanese hostilities may come to a definite conclusion.”
Mr. Salisbury, writing at the end of January, also advocated watchful waiting. He addressed himself especially to “the question whether the United States ought to adopt an economic policy toward Japan and China intended to insure failure of Japan in its attempted conquest of China”; and he undertook “to reach an answer to that question only in its relation to the welfare of the United States of America.” He stated his conclusion at the outset: “to attempt at the present time to effect the failure of Japan’s policy in China through economic measures will not serve the best interests of the United States”; and he stated it again at the end: “The conclusion arrived at in this memorandum is that the application of economic measures directed against Japan before the certainty of Japan’s success in China is established would invite the risk of a war between the United States and Japan which would be contrary to the best interests of the United States when, by waiting, risk of war with Japan may be eliminated through factors not originating in the policy of the United States.”
Mr. Adams, writing a month ago, gives account of Japan’s occupation in areas in China and setting up of machinery for exploitation; and of Japanese official statements of intention. He says: “Developments during the past few years in Manchuria and in China south of the Great Wall remove any reason for thinking that Mr. Arita’s definition of Japan’s aims might be an overstatement. It is now obvious that Japan intends to preempt for itself East Asia; that any participation by western powers or their nationals in developments there must in effect, if Japan’s plans prevail, be in aid of and subordinate to Japan’s plans; and that any participation in the trade of that area by occidental countries must be subordinate to Japan’s requirements.” He then points out what a successful execution of Japan’s intentions in China might be expected to cost the United States. He states that he has begun “to incline to the opinion that to continue to expect Japan to bog down for want of financial resources would merely be wishful thinking.” He inquires whether it would be easier to stop Japan now than to deal with the situation which would exist were Japan to consolidate her position in China. He asks, “Is it not possible that failure to take action now may in years to come be looked back upon as another lost opportunity …?” He discusses the question of cooperation among the powers toward checking “lawless neighbors”. He points out that the United States is “the only strong law-abiding [Page 510] member of the community not restrained by threat of an immediate checkmate from another quarter, from attempting to maintain order in the Far East which is a neighborhood where for a long time the United States has played a leading role.” He continues: “The United States is in a key position. Her comparative inactivity in the maintenance of community order paralyzes British and French action both in Europe and the Far East.” … “There is reason to believe that if the United States had been in a position to deal effectively with Japan in the Far East during the past year, and had been so doing, Great Britain and France would have been able to restrain Germany.” He quotes, to the point, from the Secretary of State’s speech at Nashville on June 3, 1938.77 He submits that”… if the United States should decide to act in the present emergency in the Far East, we should definitely choose between a course calculated to stop Japan and one designed merely to decrease the measure of Japan’s success in the present China venture. Unless we are prepared to make our action decisive, we would be well advised to limit our measures to steps that would not provoke thorough-going retaliation by Japan.” He discusses the “extensive field of action lying between a do-nothing policy and action having in mind possible resort to armed force.” He believes: “… that a decision to stop Japan need not necessarily lead to actual clash of our armed forces with those of Japan, particularly if the United States were prepared as a last resort to proceed to that length.” He suggests possible lines of procedure directed toward specified possible objectives (see pages 14–16).
As possible “immediate and specific objectives”, Mr. Adams suggests: (1) freedom for American cultural enterprise in China; (2) equality of financial and business opportunity for American citizens in China; (3) preservation of the integrity of Chinese Government revenue-collecting agencies; and (4) effort to preserve Japan’s dignity and self-respect. In the realm of possible action, Mr. Adams suggests: (1) notification of termination of the American Japanese commercial treaty of 1911; (2) prohibition of extension (by American nationals) of financial assistance to Japan or to “Manchukuo”; (3) withdrawal of American Ambassador to Japan; (4) effort to accomplish promptly a paralysis of Japan’s foreign trade; (5) effort to persuade other countries to adopt similar measures; and (6) extension of further financial assistance to China.
Mr. Adams takes account of the possibility that the Japanese (or some Japanese) might retaliate by measures which would adversely and seriously involve Americans and American interests in the Far East. (He has expressed, however, the view that this need not necessarily lead to a clash of armed forces.)
[Page 511]Mr. Adams’ memorandum ends with the statement: “Nevertheless, it is believed that with resolute leadership American opinion would on the whole see the justice of and support the measures suggested in this memorandum.”
I have submitted these memoranda to Ambassador Johnson and the Ambassador has made written comment on them as follows: “I have read these memoranda. I find myself more in sympathy with the statements contained in the memoranda submitted by Messrs. Adams and Vincent—especially Mr. Adams—than with the arguments of Messrs. Salisbury and Sturgeon which are of the nature of a non possumus. Salisbury at least recommends action but feels that the present is not the time. I for one feel that we must begin now to show our teeth and that we must go forward from now on or we may forever find ourselves estopped from taking action. Some day we may have a Japan claiming everything west of the 180th meridian as Japanese sphere within which we may neither fortify nor enter without Japanese permission.”
Ambassador Johnson has also made express comments in regard to particular items, as follows: “Mr. Salisbury has marshalled all of the arguments against sanctions against Japan by the United States very well. He does not oppose ultimate use of this weapon but questions whether this is the time for such measures.”
“I agree with Mr. Adams’ statement of Japanese aims in the Far East.”
“We cannot afford to wait too long. Time is with China in its conflict with Japan but time is with the totalitarian states in their relations with the democracies.”
“The British Empire is gone. In succession to its power and responsibility we have a community of independent States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, England and, more influential, the United States, which departed from the Empire earlier but with violence. The United States as the richer and more influential member of this community must take the initiative in preserving the ideals of international relations and the kind of a world which that Empire stood for and made possible.”
In this account of the contents of these memoranda, more attention has been given by the undersigned to Mr. Vincent’s and Mr. Adams’ memoranda than to Mr. Sturgeon’s and Mr. Salisbury’s memoranda, for the reason that Mr. Vincent’s and Mr. Adams’ memoranda are affirmative in character; they urge that a new attitude be adopted and new steps be taken; and, on the principle that the burden of proof lies with the affirmative, they present the constructive side of the case. Mr. Sturgeon’s and Mr. Salisbury’s memoranda support an attitude which at present prevails, and advocate, generally [Page 512] speaking, persisting for the present in that attitude, and therefore present the negative side as regards the question of “action”.
All four of these memoranda are well worth reading if time permits. The Secretary and the Under Secretary have already, some time ago, seen Mr. Vincent’s memorandum, but it is worth a re-reading.