Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, The Far East, Volume III

893.515/1347

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)⁵¹

[Washington,] January 25, 1939.

I would call most thoughtful attention to the statements of Mr. Grew and Mr. Williams⁵² quoted on the first page of the digest hereunder.⁵³

Mr. Grew states that he does not believe that anything short of force can lead to substantial moderation of Japanese policy in China and that he therefore cannot conscientiously recommend to his Government recourse to economic sanctions. Mr. Williams states to the Ambassador that it is his (Williams’) opinion that only measures envisaging extremely drastic steps backed by the determination to resort to military and naval force, if necessary, will cause Japan to deviate from her determination to exercise full and complete economic control of China.

Thus, both of these first-hand observers are in agreement that, to restrain Japan, force must enter the picture. I concur in that view. Mr. Grew, however, believing that nothing short of force can restrain Japan, feels that he cannot recommend economic sanctions; whereas Mr. Williams envisages “extremely drastic steps backed by the determination to resort to military and naval force, if necessary”. It is my view that resort to economic sanctions while declaring to the world that this country will not support and supplement such sanctions with armed force, would prove ineffective, harmful to American interests, stultifying and even dangerous, but that embarkation upon a well planned and comprehensive program of economic sanctions with an announcement or clear indication that we would be prepared, should there be need, to support and supplement those sanctions with armed force would be very likely to prove effective without its becoming necessary at any stage actually to resort to use of armed force.

I therefore favor proceeding upon a course contemplating and involving a program the opening numbers of which would be application of economic sanctions with clear indication from the outset that, if it should be necessary to carry out the whole program, the final numbers would probably be use of armed force.⁵⁴

Stanley K. Hornbeck

51. Addressed to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State.
52. Frank S. Williams, Commercial Attaché in Japan.
53. Digest not printed; for statements, see Ambassador Grew’s letter of December 7, 1938, and Mr. Williams’ memorandum of December 6, Foreign Relations, 1938, vol. iv, pp. 99 and 100.
54. The Under Secretary of State noted this comment on the memorandum: “I should like to discuss this at some length. S. W.”