740.00/1812
The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 27.]
Sir: I had the honor in my telegram no. 245, May 26, 8 p.m., to present an analysis of certain trends in Japanese thought with regard to foreign policy in relation to the situation now developing in Europe.…
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I wish to make it clear, before setting forth certain conclusions which I draw from these conversations, that I do not put forward the views of those Japanese—even though they be persons of great importance and influence—who harbor hopes of restoring good relations with the democratic nations, as being necessarily the views of the Japanese Government. These are, however, the views of a powerful element in the Government: they may prevail or they may not, but they cannot be ignored.
Any observer who is in any way sensitive to things not seen would, if he were in Tokyo today, become aware of the groping for security against the gathering storm in Europe. I should perhaps add parenthetically that the European situation today has assumed primary proportions, and that it would be visionary to suppose that the present confusion concerning the course which Japan should follow is due to despondence over the apparently ineffectual hostilities in China. The Army and other elements which have thus far controlled China policy have assumed that the Far Eastern conflict could be permanently and completely insulated against repercussions from situations elsewhere, as they did not look to American and other occidental armed intervention in that conflict. Although reference has been made in the Embassy’s telegrams to the effects of the President’s message to Chancellor Hitler, I do not believe that I could, by further reference to that message, exaggerate the impulse which it had toward [Page 44] persuading the Japanese Government to realize that there may be grave danger of involvement with the United States “not directly across the Pacific but by way of Europe”, as one Japanese put it to me. I should, however, place that observation in proper perspective. A threat by the United States to eject Japan from China would, I am confident, be resisted. But if war were to break out in Europe with the United States participating on the side of Great Britain and France, the outcome in the view of those Japanese who think along rational lines would admit of no doubt. With Germany and Italy crushed, the prospect of confronting the victors would not be a palatable one to Japan.
There are, therefore, in the situation which seems to be developing but two courses for Japan to follow—either to go over unreservedly to the totalitarian side, or to restore good relations with those nations which, in the opinion of one element of the Japanese Government, would be the victors. True, in rejecting the proposal to join Germany and Italy in an alliance, Japan provisionally chose a third course—neutrality. I am inclined, however, to doubt whether there are many Japanese who confidently believe that neutrality would afford security. The arguments of those who believe in the superior power of Germany and Italy are obvious and simple: Japan has only to associate herself with those countries and wait for the European war to pick China like a ripe plum. But, for those Japanese who have other views concerning the power of Germany and Italy, there is but one way by which Japan’s security can be safeguarded, and that is to bring the conflict with China to an end on some reasonable terms. Here again I wish to make it clear that the desire for a settlement of the conflict does not derive from moral regeneration but from realization of stark facts.
In concluding this despatch, which is already unconscionably long, I wish briefly to allude to the discrepancy between the attitude of the Prime Minister as indicated in his conversation with me and that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose preoccupation over the Anglo-Soviet negotiations has already been mentioned. It is obvious that the desire of the Prime Minister for American collaboration to bring about peace in Europe (and in the Far East) cannot be reconciled with the readiness, which is almost an eagerness, on the part of the Foreign Minister to meet a fancied threat from Great Britain. These two points of view reflect conflicting policies, and which of these policies will prevail may perhaps be decided by events of the next few days.
Respectfully yours,