793.94/15521
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
The British Ambassador called to see me at his request. After discussing certain questions in connection with the Declaration of Panama, the Ambassador said he wished to drop for the moment his official character and speak to me very frankly about a matter that was giving him great concern. He stated that the way things were now going in the Far East, it seemed to him evident that the maintenance of western interests in the Far East would be dependent entirely upon the determination which the United States might make. He said that if the Japanese Government determined to wipe out British and French interests in China, or even to take over their colonial possessions, neither the British nor the French governments under present conditions could weaken their naval forces in the Atlantic or in the North Sea, or, for that matter, in the Mediterranean because of their uncertainty as to the course which Mussolini would pursue. He said that for this reason it was clearly in the interest of Great Britain to attempt to reach an understanding with the Government of Japan which would obviate this danger and that he was fearful lest there be a recurrence of the 1931 situation as a result of which American public opinion would believe and maintain that Great Britain had sold out and had left the United States “holding the bag”. He was very much concerned lest any negotiations undertaken between Great Britain and Japan under present conditions should be regarded by the American public as a deal against the interests of the United States and as a cynical and callous selling-out of China.
The Ambassador went on to say that it seemed to him in the interest of the western powers, and particularly in the interest of the United States, for every effort to be made to further a direct understanding between China and Japan on a basis which would be fair and equitable to both sides, but with the realization on the part of both China and Japan that each side would have to make concessions. He inquired whether I shared his view.
I replied by saying that I would have to make very wide and ample reservations to the opinions expressed by the Ambassador. I said that in the first place I could not at this moment conceive that there was a real likelihood of a formal agreement being reached between the Soviet Government and Japan for the partitioning of China, and in [Page 322] order to make it possible for Japan to undertake offensive measures against British and French possessions in the Far East or even against the Netherlands East Indies. I said that, of course, anything under present conditions was possible, but it seemed to me fantastic to believe that the Japanese Government, from its own selfish standpoint, would undertake an adventure of this character, knowing perfectly well that Russian policy in the Far East was inevitably antagonistic to Japanese policy and knowing equally well that no reliance could be placed by Japan upon any agreement which might be proffered by the Soviet Government. I said it seemed to me far more likely that Japan would consider it in her best interest to try and work out some basis of understanding with the United States and with Great Britain and France before she would give any serious consideration to Russian proposals.
With specific regard to the Ambassador’s last statement, I said that I could only assume that when the Ambassador said that China must be made to realize that she would have to agree to concessions in undertaking to arrive at peace terms with Japan, the Ambassador had in mind concessions of a character which would grant to Japan some preferential interest in China, some form of economic or military domination in some part of China, and that if I had correctly understood his statement, I wanted to make it entirely clear that this Government did not share that view, nor could it proceed along any course which would be destined to further such an arrangement. I stated that the position of this Government in that regard had been made more than clear and had been reiterated. We could not agree to participate in any move which would be regarded by China and Japan as an exercise of influence or pressure on our part destined to bring China to relinquish in any measure whatever her complete exercise of sovereignty within her territory. Further than that, I said, any such arrangement as that would imply a willingness on our part to agree to some form of military or economic, preferential position for Japan in China; and our insistence upon the recognition of our legal and treaty rights in China and our insistence upon equality of opportunity for all nations in China was so well known as to require no further emphasis from myself at this point.
Of course, I said, I believed that the sooner peace between Japan and China could be restored, the better it would be for the interests of the United States, solely provided that the kind of peace which was brought about was a peace of the character I had indicated. I said that I had no reason to believe that the government of General Chiang had any intention at this stage of considering peace terms of a character other than that which I had indicated and, unfortunately, in so far as the Government of Japan was concerned, I had no reason to believe that the Government of Japan would agree [Page 323] upon any peace terms similar to those which I had indicated. Consequently, it seemed to me that there was no ground for hope of peace unless the Government of the United States and certain other governments attempted to bring some pressure to bear upon China to make a peace which was neither equitable nor based upon the foundations I had outlined, and that, I said, I could assure the Ambassador with all positiveness the Government of the United States would not agree to do.
The Ambassador asked if my statement were to be interpreted as meaning that the Government of the United States, if an equitable and fair peace which was not in derogation of the sovereignty of China could be reached, would refuse to recognize the nominal independence of Manchukuo and Japanese domination of Manchuria.
I replied that the position of this Government on that question had been made plain not only by the preceding Administration, but by the present Administration, and that I saw no reason to suppose at this time that there would be any variation in the position taken. I reminded the Ambassador, however, of the statements contained in the communication addressed by this Government to the Government of Japan on December 31, 1938,15 in which it had been made clear that this Government believed that the course of negotiation with China and with all the powers directly concerned in China was open to the Government of Japan, and that this Government by no means assumed the position that any treaty was not susceptible of modification, provided such modification was obtained as a result of free negotiation between all concerned.
- For the note dated December 30, 1938 (delivered December 31), from the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 820.↩