893.00/14480
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 2.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s despatch No. 306, of August 18, 1939, entitled, “Conditions in Northwestern Provinces of China” and to Shanghai’s telegram of October 23, 6.00 p.m. concerning the position of the Chinese Communist force known as the Eighth Route Army with respect to the National Government.
[Page 308]Since friction between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party continues to be a source of uneasiness to well-wishers of China, it seems worth while to invite the attention of the Department to an interview with the Communist leader Mao Tse-tung on September 11, 1939, which was published in the Hsing Hua Jih Pao, the Chungking Communist organ, on October 20, 1939. A translation and copy are enclosed.1 A reading of Mao’s statements, if it influences the Occidental reader at all, seems to the Embassy calculated to strengthen the opinion of those who believe that the attitude of the so-called “Communists” in the present controversy is more praiseworthy than that of the Kuomintang. Many Americans have the impression that Chinese Communism of the present day resembles far more American democratic concepts than it does either the theories or the practice of present-day Communist Russia. It may be that this favorable view is inspired less by knowledge of the political theories of the Eighth Route Army and its associates than by reports that have been brought out from the Northwest praising the patriotism, bravery, self-sacrifice, and devotion to education and popular betterment of the Communist authorities at Yenan, in Shensi Province.
However that may be, if one starts with this bias in favor of the “Communist” Government in the Northwest one is convinced by the logic of Mao Tse-tung’s assertions that there should be no friction between such political parties as earnestly desire to cooperate in the war of resistance to Japanese invasion; that the creation of a “democratic” government in China is essential to the winning of the war and to post-war reconstruction; and that the Chinese Communist Party desires to cooperate with the Kuomintang, but can do so only in the event that it is assured that it will not meet with interference in the prosecution of its two aims of resistance to the Japanese and the creation of a democratic government in China.
Following publication of the Mao Tse-tung interview on October 20 Secretary Weil had opportunity to discuss it with several prominent Government officials. There is enclosed a memorandum dated October 23, 1939,1 of his conversation with Mr. Peng Hsueh-pei, Vice Minister of Communications, foreign-educated and a member of the Kuomintang. The entire memorandum is interesting, but it seems desirable here to call attention especially to Mr. Peng’s belief that the Communist Party, specifically the Eighth Route Army, is receiving material support from the Soviet Government and is subservient to Stalin; his refusal to credit the Communists with any important betterment of the condition of the people in the areas they control; his statement [Page 309] that a “constitutional assembly” would be held within a few months for the ostensible purpose of creating a democratic form of government, but really to execute a prepared program; and his confidence that while the Communists constituted a threat to the power of the Chinese Government, the Government could remove this danger when hostilities with Japan were ended.
In spite of the cynicism tingeing Mr. Peng’s observations, his belief regarding the subservience of the Chinese Communist Party to Moscow is so commonly expressed that one must credit many officials of the National Government with genuinely sharing his opinion and with having, from their standpoint, adequate reason for suspicion of the Communist Party. Nor can one quarrel with Mr. Peng’s idea that the mass of the Chinese people are not qualified to conduct a “democratic form of government”, if by that is meant a government of popular franchise on the Anglo-Saxon plan. What Mao Tse-tung seemed to have in mind was something more in the nature of local self-government. It is disquieting to observe that Mr. Peng seemed to foresee forcible removal of the Communist “threat” after hostilities should have been concluded. It would be difficult to imagine anything that would be more calculated to alienate foreign opinion from the Chinese Government than would recrudescence of internecine warfare in China, especially if it were between the Government and the force made popular in the United States by Mr. Edgar Snow’s book, Red Star Over China.
Mr. Weil likewise spoke on the subject with General Chu Shihming, Director of the Department of Intelligence and Publicity of the Foreign Office. A memorandum of the conversation is enclosed.2 (In this connection it should be pointed out that Mr. Weil was subsequently informed by Dr. Hsu Mo, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the issue of the paper publishing the Mao Tse-tung interview was suppressed, not on account of the interview, but on account of an editorial that was held to reveal political secrets.) It will be observed that General Chu was even more emphatic in his assertion that the Government would deal with the Communist threat through force than Mr. Peng was. Mr. Weil is inclined to think, however, that this emphasis on the ability of the Government to suppress the Communists by forcible means may be in part a reflection of a supposition on the part of the Chinese speakers that Americans are strongly opposed to all persons labeled as “Communists” and would view with disfavor any apparent surrender to them by the Government.
In the course of preparation of this despatch, which has been much delayed by press of routine, Mr. Weil prepared a memorandum dated [Page 310] November 9, giving the gist of interesting conversations with other persons on the subject of the Eighth Route Army. A copy is enclosed.4
Respectfully yours,