793.94/15426: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:20 p.m.]
2534. Li Yu Ying82 called on me this morning. He left Chungking on the third of this month and was accompanied as far as Hanoi by T. V. Soong. He said that General Chiang Kai Shek had requested him to give me the following personal message.
His policies and convictions remained the same as they had been at the time of our conversations in Nanking in the autumn of 1934.83 I could be absolutely certain that—whatever rumors to the contrary I might hear—he would continue to fight to the bitter end until Japanese [Page 296] troops should be withdrawn from Chinese soil. He positively would not agree to a compromise peace. He was absolutely confident with regard to his present position and felt certain that he could continue to maintain resistance to Japanese aggression not merely for 2 or 3 years but for an indefinite future if necessary.
My informant, Li Yu Ying, went on to say that Chiang Kai Shek had ordered him to break off his visit to the western provinces of China and leave hurriedly for Paris because of telegrams from Wellington Koo which indicated that the French Government was contemplating a change in its policy vis-à-vis China and Japan.
Koo had expressed the fear that France would first mollify Japan by placing further apparent restrictions on exports to China by way of French Indo-China (while in reality permitting the passage of goods as formerly) but that at a later date France would attempt to bring pressure on the Chinese Government to agree to a settlement of the present war satisfactory to Japan.
Li Yu Ying said that he was at Hanoi when the French Governor General had summoned the Chinese Consul and informed him that no more shipments would be permitted over the French railroad. Two days later, however, the French Governor General had summoned the Chinese Consul and had informed him that trucks and gasoline could go through as heretofore. This action had seemed to indicate that Wellington Koo’s fears were well grounded.
Li Yu Ying added that on arrival in Paris he had called at once on Mandel, Minister of Colonies, and had received a full and satisfactory explanation, which indicated that the same goods would continue to go forward over the French railroad through Indo-China as had been going forward in the past over that line.
He asked me if I was under the impression that the French Government intended to change its policy vis-à-vis China and Japan adding that Chiang Kai Shek had requested him to obtain my personal opinion on this point.
I explained the fears of the French and British which had produced the decision, now in suspense, to withdraw the French and British troops and gunboats from Chinese territory. I added that certain French officials especially Leger had been intensely apprehensive that the Soviet Union might send bombing planes to assist the German Army in attacking France and that their somewhat hysterical conclusion had been that France might be able to persuade Japan to attack the Soviet Union. They desired therefore to placate Japan.
I added that fears of a Soviet military attack on France had now greatly diminished and that Leger himself had said to me yesterday that he did not now believe that there was any danger that Soviet bombers would be sent to assist the German army. I did not, therefore, [Page 297] consider that there was any immediate danger of a fundamental change in French policy vis-à-vis China and Japan.
Li Yu Ying said that Mandel had stated to him that the French Government had information to the effect that the German Government had made an attempt to mediate between China and Japan (see my No. 2391, October 9, 5 p.m. and your No. 1277, October 19, 9 p.m.84) and had gone so far as to state that he understood that Hitler had written a personal letter to Chiang Kai Shek.
Li Yu Ying said that he could not guarantee that some such move had not been made by the German Government since he had been absent for some time from Chungking and Chiang Kai Shek might have forgotten to mention the matter to him.
He felt absolutely certain, however, that if the German Government had made any such proposal Chiang Kai Shek had rejected it immediately. He was absolutely certain that the Generalissimo would not consider any compromise now with Japan. He had telegraphed Mandel’s inquiry to Chiang Kai Shek and expected to have a definite reply within the next 2 or 3 days which he would communicate to me.
The Generalissimo, he added, was completely confident that China in the end would emerge victorious.
- President of the Chinese National Academy.↩
- For extracts of Ambassador Bullitt’s report on his visit to Japan and China, see his despatch dated January 8, 1935, Foreign Relations, 1935, vol iii, p. 4.↩
- Telegram No. 1277 reported No. 558, October 17, 1 p.m., from the Ambassador in China, p. 288.↩