793.94/15531
The Consul at Hanoi (Reed) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 6.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s telegraphic instruction to the Embassy at Peiping,68 assigning me as consul at Saigon but directing that I proceed to Hanoi and Haiphong for the purpose of carrying out the functions set forth in Ambassador Johnson’s telegram [Page 273] to the Department, No. 393, June 17, 11 a.m.68a In pursuance therewith I proceeded to Hanoi from Saigon, where I arrived the morning of September 13, arriving at Hanoi the afternoon of September 16.
Since my arrival at Hanoi I have called upon and have established friendly relations with the majority of the French officials in this city, particular effort being made to cultivate those officials whose decisions and ideas have a peculiar bearing upon the situation in China and upon the progress of the Sino-Japanese conflict. I have made summaries of my various conversations with these officials but, as much of the material set forth in these memoranda is repetitious, I submit herewith an outline of the matters discussed.
My conversation with the Governor General, General Georges Catroux, was especially interesting and covered a wide range of subjects. The Governor General expressed the opinion that the outbreak of war in Europe would alter to a large extent the conditions prevailing in Indochina. Insofar as French-American relations are concerned, it will be necessary to rely upon importations from the United States, cars and trucks, and other essentials, which can no longer be supplied by France. He added that every facility will be given to American interests in Indochina. Insofar as French-Chinese relations are concerned, it will be necessary to review these in detail and to make such changes as are called for by the altered conditions in Europe. He explained that France is generally sympathetic to the Chinese cause, although the Chinese have not shown a reciprocal understanding of French desires, but that France can not afford to jeopardize Indochina and will accordingly follow a policy of purely political expediency. He referred openly to the danger of Japanese aggression, from bases at Hainan and on the Spratley Islands, and stated that this possibility is a factor which enters into the question of the establishment of a new policy towards Chinese affairs. In any event, he concluded, his personal opinion was that the Sino-Japanese conflict will be liquidated in the not too distant future.
As a matter of fact, the majority of French officials in Indochina have expressed the same opinion regarding the future course of events in China, commenting that the outbreak of war in Europe will so alter the policies of the countries at war as to lead ultimately to a liquidation of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The majority, including the Governor General, remarked that this settlement of Far Eastern affairs will solve a number of very embarrassing problems, such as the transit of goods to China, and will remove an actively apprehended danger to Indochina. All officials (and among these I may mention the Secretary General of the Government General, the Director of the [Page 274] Political Section, the Director of the Economic Section, the Director of Customs and Monopolies, et cetera) commented that the transit of goods to China is the subject of Japanese suspicion and that the unprecedented accumulation of cargo at the port of Haiphong does nothing to dispel this suspicion. Consequently, some limitations must be placed upon this transit of goods in order to remove this accumulation and to remove at least a modicum of Japanese suspicion. The Director of the Economic Section of the Government General, Mr. Louis Marty, was especially categorical in blaming the Chinese for the confused situation at Haiphong and thus attracting Japanese attention.
That the French are extremely apprehensive of Japanese action in this region, particularly since the outbreak of the war in Europe, is evidenced in part by the entrenchments and bombproof shelters constructed in all parks and public places, and in even private gardens. At Doson, a seaside resort near Haiphong, and at other seaside places, a large number of French have vacated their houses, in fear of Japanese bombings. This apprehension, and a measure of exasperation with the Chinese, explains the possible wishful thinking that the Sino-Japanese conflict will soon be liquidated.
French officials, especially the Director of the Political Section, Mr. Mantovani, do not consider Governor Lung Yun of Yunnan a particularly faithful ally of the National Government. Instances were cited purporting to show that the Lung Yun regime is paying enforced lip service to the National Government, but with independent ideas as to what should and should not be done, particularly as regards financial matters. Mr. Mantovani opined that a revival of the Southwestern faction, including Yunnan, is not a too far-fetched possibility. I have been told that Indochina would view with pleasure the establishment of a buffer state comprising Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan. Mr. Mantovani stated his belief that emissaries of Wang Ching-wei are still endeavoring to wean Yunnan from the side of the National Government. In general, however, French officials tend to discount the influence of Wang Ching-wei, either in Yunnan or elsewhere.
Both the Governor General and the Secretary General, Mr. Del-salle, mentioned the projected new Central Government to be organized by Wang Ching-wei and queried whether this would have any effect upon the course of events in China. In fact there was some doubt if this government would be inaugurated. Similarly, the Bus-so-Japanese truce was the subject of comment—it being doubted that either side could place any great reliance or confidence in the truce.
Conversations with non-official persons conversant with the situation in Indochina both before and after the outbreak of war in Europe confirm the impression I received during my conversations with various officials at Hanoi—that before the war the French were inclined [Page 275] to let things go as in the past, with only a remote apprehension of political difficulties in the Far East; that subsequent to the outbreak of war the French have instituted or are instituting such measures (directly affecting China) which will ensure the minimum of danger to France in the Far East. There is no question, however, but that the French are still reasonably sympathetic towards the Chinese and, if assistance can be rendered to China without protest from the Japanese, the French will continue to render such assistance.
It is true that the French are somewhat annoyed with the Chinese on account of the Chinese embargo on imports into China of certain commodities (luxuries, et cetera). And I have heard, but this has not been confirmed, that the French undertook a measure of retaliation, particularly in regard to port dues of various types and other matters which were a matter of discretion. But France may not now be in a position to export these commodities to China. In this matter, as in others, the fact that France is at war and is preparing for a war of possible long duration completely alters the picture and ensures that the French policy, especially in the Far East, will be one of understandable self-interest and political expediency.
Respectfully yours,