893.0146/724
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
The British Ambassador called this afternoon and I handed him the aide-mémoire which constitutes this Government’s reply60 to the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of September 19 on the subject of the armed forces in China. I pointed out that the substance of our reply is in the paragraph in which we state that “this Government therefore does not expect to withdraw its forces from the points at which they are now stationed.” I stated that this is a statement of our position in terms of expectation and that it represents a position taken in the light of existing circumstances, that it does not constitute a commitment, and that, as the situation develops, we would expect from time to time to review and reconsider our position.
Lord Lothian asked whether he might ask two questions: first, have we any reason to believe that the Japanese and the Chinese are likely in the near future to make peace; second, in the event of British and French withdrawal of their forces from north China, would we remain. He gave some account of indications which caused him to raise the first of these two questions. I replied that we have no evidence which indicates to us that the Chinese are prepared to make peace on the terms to which he referred: namely, an agreement which would give the Japanese a preferred position in north China together with maintenance there by them of armed forces. I said that the Japanese are at present concentrating, apparently, on two things: first, effort to set up a central puppet government, at Nanking; second, a new military drive against Chinese armed forces at certain points, especially around Changsha. I said that I have doubt whether the Japanese will have succeeded in setting up the puppet government which they envisage by October 10 or even by November 15, and that, therefore, all that we can do in connection with that matter is to maintain an attitude of watchful waiting. Lord Lothian asked whether we thought that the Japanese would be able to wipe out Chiang Kai-shek. I replied that they are constantly trying to do that by dropping bombs, but that in our opinion it would be a long time before they could wipe him out by political pressures. There followed some discussion of the effects in the Far East of the Russian-German agreement and of action taken by the American Government. I pointed out that of late the Japanese abuse of British and of American nationals and interests seems to have relaxed and that, in connection with such matters as Shanghai, the Japanese are now proposing [Page 269] revision of the defense plan and they are not saying anything about throwing anybody into the Whangpoo River. Lord Lothian said that the Secretary of State had told him of his conversations with the Japanese Ambassador and that the British Government’s solicitude had been that we should use our moral influence, as the account of these conversations indicated that we had done.
I then said that, in reply to Lord Lothian’s second question, the answer is given in the aide-mémoire of today. I said that we had considered many angles, including the possibility of British and French withdrawals, and had arrived at the conclusion that we would leave our forces where they are.
Lord Lothian inquired whether we were giving the same reply to the French that we had given to him. I replied that I had handed a similar aide-mémoire to the French Ambassador an hour previously,61 the French Ambassador having chosen to call at an hour earlier than that chosen by Lord Lothian.
I read to Lord Lothian, as an oral statement, an informal memorandum with regard to the armed forces, of which a copy is here attached.62 Lord Lothian began to read to me from a memorandum which he had in his hand a statement with regard to “battalions” and “companies”. I interrupted with the statement that I would ask of him, as I had on earlier occasions asked of Sir Ronald Lindsay, that we be given figures instead of statements about military units—for the reason that these armed forces are small in numbers and the terms “regiment”, “battalion”, etc., have no meaning for purposes of comparison, as both the full strength and the actual strength of such units in different organizations and at different moments vary. I added that we already have the figures, as indicated in the memorandum which I had read, but that we would be glad to have confirmation in terms of British figures. Lord Lothian said that he would ask for figures.63
At one point in the conversation, Lord Lothian said that he had been informed that a prominent Japanese who is now in this country has stated that he is going to Japan and intends to say to his Government that Japan is in no position to carry out objectives of conquest in China, that Japan cannot exploit the resources of China without financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States, that Japan should liquidate the China hostilities and should cease to irritate the British and the Americans and should make peace with China and cultivate friendly relations with those countries. Lord Lothian wanted to know whether I had heard of this. I said that I had not.
[Page 270]The conversation then turned to the situation in Europe. It became apparent that we were in agreement that any one of several things might happen and any one of the same and other things might not happen.
At no point in the conversation did Lord Lothian make any request for indication of our views as to what the British or the French Governments should do with their armed forces in China or as to what policy we would pursue except as indicated above; and at no point did I say anything on those subjects.