893.0146/704: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 26—3:05 p.m.]
2179. My 1901, September 11, 1 p.m., and 1978, September 15, 1 p.m. Chauvel, Director of the Far Eastern Section of the Foreign Office, stated to me today that both the French Foreign Office and the British Ambassador in Washington had been opposed to the form in which the joint démarche of the French and British Ambassadors to you had been made. The British Foreign Office, however, had insisted on the question being put as it was put.
He added that Saint-Quentin had been instructed that insofar as the French Government was concerned a statement by you that you did not desire the French troops to leave Shanghai would be considered a sufficiently affirmative reply.
Chauvel went on to say that he had received so many apparently authoritative reports that [about?] secret negotiations between Chiang Kai Shek and Wang Ching Wei that in order to clarify the situation he had through an entirely unofficial intermediary caused the suggestion to be made to Chiang Kai Shek that he should come to terms with Wang Ching Wei and attempt to achieve peace with Japan through Wang Ching Wei.
Yesterday the Chinese Ambassador in Paris had called on him and had stated officially that Chiang Kai Shek would have nothing whatsoever to do with Wang Ching Wei and would continue to fight against the Japanese invaders.
He was left with the impression that while this might be Chiang Kai Shek’s personal point of view Kung’s point of view might be different.
Chauvel added that the continuation of resistance by Chiang Kai Shek would depend not only on his own will to resist but also on the Soviet Union’s continued support of him and on the position which the ruler of Yunnan should take. It was by no means certain that Yunnan would not cooperate with a Wang Ching Wei Government and it was by no means certain that the Soviet Union would continue to support Chiang Kai Shek although Sun Fo recently had received Russian promises of further support.
In conclusion as an entirely personal view Chauvel expressed the opinion that the wars now in progress in Europe and Asia might bring about the most unexpected combinations. For example, if Germany should begin to be defeated by France and England and should seek refuge in becoming a Bolshevik state and admit the Red Army to German territory it might be in the interest of France and England to support Japan in an attack on the Soviet Union.
[Page 265]Under the circumstances the fact that Japan knew that Vladivostok would remain a constant threat to Japan so long as it should be in the hands of the Soviet Union constituted a basis for possible rapprochement with Japan. He wondered if it might not be very appropriate for Ambassador Grew on reaching Tokyo to take up the entire question of long term as well as short term relations between the United States, France, England, and Japan with a view to keeping doors open for future cooperation.
I desire to emphasize that these remarks were entirely personal in nature and were not an official communication from the French Government. Chauvel himself is entirely opposed to the withdrawal of French and British troops and ships from China and in making the remarks reported above was not speaking as a defeatist but merely looking toward long term possibilities.
Owing to the preoccupation of higher placed officials of the French Government with the situation in Europe, Chauvel’s views with regard to the Far East are apt to control French policy.55